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Abstract 
Integrated Production, Inventory and Pricing Decisions  
in Two-Echelon Supply Chains 
Changyuan Yan 
Advisor: Avijit Banerjee, Ph.D. 
 
This thesis investigates the optimal decisions for maximizing the expected 
profit level of a supply chain when market demand is price-sensitive. We examine 
two-echelon supply chains consisting of a single manufacturer and one or more 
retailers, where the organizations simultaneously determine the retail price, 
production lot size and inventory replenishment schedules to maximize the profit of 
the entire supply chain. In particular, we first develop a model for single-
manufacturer single-retailer (SMSR) supply chains, assuming deterministic market 
demand. We then extend the SMSR model to supply chains with multiple-retailers 
(i.e. SMMR supply chains). Finally, we examine both SMSR and SMMR supply 
chains in stochastic market demand environments. We show that supply chain 
cooperation/centralization brings higher profits for the manufacturer and the 
retailer(s), and benefits retail consumers with a lower retail price. We propose 
efficient algorithms for our models and illustrate them through numerical examples. 
Managerial implications and future research directions are also discussed. 
11 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
With rapid developments in market globalization and information technology, supply
chain management has become one of the most important strategic aspects of orga-
nizations and plays an increasingly important role in their business success. Today’s
competitive environment requires companies to provide better products with lower op-
erational costs for consumers with heightened expectations, which forces companies to
continuously find ways to improve their supply chain management practices. Compa-
nies have to find effective ways to coordinate the production of goods and/or services,
to manage their inventories, and to distribute goods and/or services timely. Many com-
panies, especially in the manufacturing (e.g. Toyota) and the retail sectors (e.g. Wal-
Mart), are frequently cited for their excellence in managing their supply chains1, which
contribute significantly towards their overall business success.
Supply chain management is defined by Mentzer et.al (2001) as “the systemic,
strategic coordination of the traditional business functions and the tactics across these
business functions within a particular company and across businesses within the sup-
ply chain, for the purposes of improving the long-term performance of the individual
companies and the supply chain as a whole” (Mentzer et.al., 2001, p.18). As this def-
inition indicates, integration of business functions within a company and coordination
of businesses within a supply chain are two important ways to improve the overall per-
formance of the entire supply chain.
1For example, http://www.businessweek.com/adsections/2005/pdf/0515_supply.pdf
2In fact, there is a growing trend in practice towards integrated supply chain man-
agement. According to a report by Deloitte Consulting, “extending the supply chain is
number one priority” for many large manufacturers and retailers in North America2 .
Organizations increasingly find that they must rely on effective and integrated supply
chains to succeed in the global market. Moreover, due to the developments in infor-
mation and communication technologies, companies are able to exchange production,
inventory and market information in a timely manner with each other, which facilitates
supply chain integration. Therefore, more and more companies are moving towards
building business partnership with other supply chain members, while integrating their
own business functions.
As mentioned above, companies can integrate business functions in two directions:
cooperating closely over the supply chain (vertical direction) and integrating differ-
ent business functions within the company (horizontal direction). On the one hand,
companies can work closely with other parties within the supply chain to reduce costs
and increase the profitability of the whole supply chain. Then, through a coordina-
tion mechanism, every party in the supply chain can share the resulting benefits. On the
other hand, companies can integrate their decision processes in their business functions,
such as production, inventory, and pricing, to reduce the operational costs and increase
their own profitability.
Supply chain integration issues have been extensively studied by researchers in the
field. In particular, researchers examine supply chains consisting of a manufacturer
(vendor) and one or several retailers (buyers), where an item is produced by the manu-
2Deloitte Consulting, Energizing the Supply Chain: Trends and Issues in Supply Chain Management,
Report, Deloitte Consulting LLC, 1999.
3facturer and sold in a price-sensitive market via the retailer(s). One aspect of research
on vertical direction integration (i.e., for a given retail price and market demand, how
the manufacturer and the retailers work in a cooperative manner to reduce the produc-
tion and distribution costs for the entire supply chain) is the joint economic lot-sizing
problem (JELP). Whereas some research on horizontal direction integration issues (i.e.,
how the retailer(s) can make joint decisions on its/their pricing and inventory polices
to maximize its/their profits) has focused on the joint pricing and inventory control
problem. Both these two streams of research have been extensively developed to cover
various realistic aspects in real-world supply chain management, such as examining
more than two-echelon supply chains, incorporating production capacity, considering
delivery lead time, etc. A comprehensive review of these two streams of research is
provided in the second section of this thesis.
It is widely demonstrated that both the integration of business functions and the inte-
gration (cooperation) over a supply chain can improve the profitability of the entire sup-
ply chain. In contrast, if each party in a supply chain works in a non-cooperative manner
and tries to maximize its own profit, or if decisions on different business functions are
made in isolation, lower profit levels accrue to the supply chain. Thus, researchers
have proposed integration methods in vertical and horizontal directions respectively, to
ensure higher profit levels for the entire supply chain.
Although research on both vertical and horizontal directions of supply chain inte-
gration has been well developed, surprisingly little attention has been paid to integration
in these two directions simultaneously. In practice, organizations not only can integrate
their own business functions but also can cooperate with each other in the supply chain.
4Particularly, in a supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and several retailers facing
price-sensitive market demand, the manufacturer and the retailers can work in a coop-
erative manner to make decisions on production, inventory control and retail pricing
simultaneously to ensure higher profitability for the entire supply chain. The tradi-
tional JELP models do not address this situation since they assume that market demand
is exogenous and is not price dependent. The existing research on the joint pricing and
inventory control problems, which focuses on an individual company, fails to take into
account the cooperation between the manufacturer and the retailers.
It is likely that integrating the supply chain in these two directions simultaneously
can further improve the profit level of the entire supply chain. Therefore, it is meaning-
ful to fill this gap pertaining to the two research streams of supply chain integration and
examine the issues of how companies can simultaneously integrate the supply chain
in two directions, i.e., integrating business functions within a particular company and
cooperating with other parties within the supply chain. Research in this respect is likely
not only to contribute to the literature of supply chain integration, but also to provide
effective integration methods with important managerial implications for real-world
supply chain management practice. Furthermore, in future, this work can be extended
in various directions, and become a building block for designing more effective and
realistic supply chains.
1.2 Objectives and Research Questions
The main objective of this dissertation is to develop efficient methods to simultane-
ously integrate a supply chain in both vertical and horizontal directions. In particular,
5we consider the situation where an item is produced by a manufacturer in lots and
each lot is delivered via several shipments to one or several retailers that face a price-
sensitive market demand. We attempt to address the issue of how the manufacturer
and the retailer(s) can work in a cooperative manner (i.e., a centralized supply chain)
to maximize the profit of the entire supply chain by making joint decisions on produc-
tion lot size (i.e., the number of items to produce in each production batch), delivery
schedule, inventory control, and retail price. We compare our results with a supply
chain where the manufacturer and the retailers(s) work in a non-cooperative manner
(i.e., a decentralized supply chain) in order to show the beneficial effects of centralized
decisions.
In the real world, a particular item produced by a manufacturer may be delivered to
a single or multiple retailers. Moreover, demands of some items are more predictable,
while others are less predictable with higher variability. Thus, it is necessary to examine
a number of cases of demand, in order to address the complex concerns in the real
world. In this dissertation, we start our analysis with a single-manufacturer single-
retailer supply chain, where market demand is deterministic and dependent on the retail
price. The major research questions of interest in this case are: (1) How to determine
the production lot size, the number of shipments per production lot, and the retail price
to maximize the profit of the entire supply chain? (2) What are the effects of such
integrated decisions on channel profit, the profit of the manufacturer, the profit of the
retailer(s), and the resulting consumer benefit?
When there is more than one retailer in the supply chain, they may have differ-
ent cost parameters, and, thus, may desire different inventory replenishment policies.
6Replenishment schedules of the various retailers should be coordinated and schedule
feasibility must be guaranteed, while maximizing the profit of the entire supply chain.
Therefore, in addition to the issue of how the manufacturer and the retailers can co-
operate with each other to maximize the profit of the entire supply chain, some other
interesting questions are also addressed: (1) How the manufacturer can coordinate the
inventory replenishment schedules of the retailers? (2) How do the single-retailer and
multiple-retailer supply chains differ?
When market demand is stochastic and highly unpredictable, joint decisions in-
volving production, inventory control and pricing become much more complex. When
making their decisions, the manufacturer and the retailers must balance the holding
costs of safety stocks and possible shortage costs associated with stochastic market de-
mand. Therefore, when market demand is stochastic, the production lot size and the
stock replenishment quantity are not constant but vary according to realized market de-
mand in previous periods. We propose a production and inventory policy and develop
the methods to find the optimal solution under the proposed policy.
In summary, this dissertation aims to provide analytical models and methods to
solve the problem of integrated production, inventory and pricing decisions under vari-
ous situations. In term of theoretical research, this dissertation attempts to fill a gap in
the existing literature and serve as a building block for future research in this important
area. In term of practice, this dissertation intents to provide some useful managerial
insights and guidelines for action to supply chain managers.
71.3 Contributions
The problem of integrated production, inventory and pricing decisions is simple to state
but difficult to solve. As we point out in section §2, there exists little academic work on
this problem, although extensive research has been done on the problem of integrated
inventory and pricing decisions and the problem of joint production and inventory de-
cisions (i.e. joint economic lot-sizing problem). To our best knowledge, Jokar and
Sajadieh (2009) provide the only existing work directly addressing this problem. How-
ever, they assume a lot-for-lot policy and thus significantly simplify the problem. Be-
sides, they provide only an approximate solution for single-manufacturer single-retailer
supply chains under deterministic market demands.
We believe that one reason for the lack of existing research in this respect involves
analytical challenges. The first challenge is that the objective function in the problem,
the centralized total channel profit, is not simply convex or concave on the decision
variables. Thus it is difficult to derive the optimal solution from the optimality con-
ditions. Particularly, since the number of shipments is limited to be positive integers,
the maximization problem becomes more difficult to solve. A second challenge lies in
the extension to the scenario of multiple retailers and the stochastic demand environ-
ment. Most of existing research focuses on the single manufacturer and single retailer
case under deterministic demand. Although some of the existing literature deals with
multiple retailers or stochastic demand, most of it is focused on the problem of joint
production and inventory decisions or the problem of integrated inventory and pricing
decisions. The analyses are usually developed under restrictive assumptions, provid-
ing limited insights on how to extend the problem to multiple retailers, as well as to
8stochastic market demand. As a pioneering work in this area, this dissertation attempts
to contribute to both the literature and the managerial practice.
This study contributes to the literature by developing analytical models to address
the problem of integrated production, inventory and pricing decisions in two-echelon
supply chains. These models fill a gap between the existing works concerning inte-
grated inventory and pricing decisions and those that deal with the joint economic lot-
sizing problem. We not only develop a model for the single-manufacturer single-retailer
case, but also extend it to single-manufacturer multiple-retailer supply chains, as well
as supply chains with stochastic demand. We also discuss potential future research on
this area based on our models in developed section §6.
Another potential contribution of this dissertation involves the efficient methods
developed for solving the proposed models. We outline some propositions of the max-
imization problems, which enable us to develop binary-search algorithms to arrive at
the optimal retail price. In addition, we provide analytical procedure for determining
the remaining decision variable values based on the search-based optimal retail price.
Our suggested algorithms to search the optimal retail price are efficient, having a rela-
tively low complexity of O(log2N), and can be easily implemented in widely available
computational software packages, such as Excel, R and Matlab, which are commonly
used in business environments.
In terms of managerial practice, this dissertation offers useful managerial insights
on supply chain cooperation and centralized decisions. We show the advantages of
a centralized supply chain in term of total channel profit and consumer benefit. We
suggest ways to incentivize the manufacturer and the retailers to cooperate with each
9other, and provide important insights on channel integration and market regulation. For
example, our analysis shows that the centralization of supply chains with a relatively
powerful manufacturer and a weak retailer brings higher extra social benefit than the
centralization of supply chains with a powerful retailer and a weak manufacturer. In
other words, channel integration is more beneficial for supply chains dominated by the
manufacturer. Additional managerial implications are discussed in section §6.
The rest of this study is organized as follows: in section §2, we provide a compre-
hensive review of the two major streams of research relevant to this dissertation. We
then develop models for centralized and decentralized supply chains, respectively, with
deterministic demand for the single-manufacturer single-retailer case in section §3. We
extend our analysis to the single-manufacturer multiple-retailer case in section §4, fol-
lowed by stochastic demand models in section §5. Finally, in section §6, we conclude
this thesis by summarizing our findings and providing discussions on the managerial
implications of our research, and point to possible future research directions. The no-
tational schema used in this thesis are listed in Appendix 6.2.3. The MATLAB codes
used for analytical purpose are listed in Appendix 6.2.3. All the necessary mathemat-
ical proofs pertaining to sections 3, 4, and 5 are presented in Appendices 6.2.3, 6.2.3
and 6.2.3, respectively.
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2 Literature Review
The two major streams of research mentioned earlier related to this thesis have been
extensively studied by academicians. One of them pertains to the joint economic lot-
sizing problem (JELP) in supply chain management; and the other deals with the prob-
lem of joint pricing and inventory control. The former focuses on integration across
the supply chain members (the manufacturer and the retailer); whereas, the latter ad-
dresses the integration of business functions (i.e. pricing and inventory control) within
an individual supply chain member (e.g. the retailer).
As mentioned before, the Joint Economic Lot-sizing Problem (JELP) concerns sup-
ply chain integration in the “vertical direction”, i.e., via cooperation between different
business parties within the supply chain, where the manufacturer and the retailer co-
operate with each other in order to reduce the production and distribution costs for
the whole supply chain. Basic JELP models attempt to minimize supply chain costs,
including production, inventory holding, ordering, and shipment costs, for the entire
system. Typically, an item is produced by a manufacturer in lots and each lot is shipped
to the retailer via several deliveries. The production lot-size and the shipment schedule
are decided jointly by both the manufacturer and the retailer in a cooperative manner.
In this stream of research, market demand is usually assumed to be exogenous and the
retail price, being fixed, is not a decision variable.
Another stream of the research concerns supply chain integration in the “horizontal
direction”, i.e., the joint pricing and inventory control problem for an individual mem-
ber of the supply chain, such as a retailer or a manufacturer which sells its products
11
directly to consumers (DTC). market demand is usually assumed to be price-sensitive,
and the retail price is an important decision variable. Within an individual company,
the joint decisions on pricing and inventory control can be made to maximize the ex-
pected profit of the firm. Two types of research are included in this stream. One is
the retailing problem, where a retailer makes joint decisions on its ordering and pricing
policies. The other is the manufacturing problem, i.e., a DTC manufacturer decides the
production and pricing policies simultaneously. For a retailer, the decision variables in-
volve its own inventory replenishment policy, as well as the retail price; whereas a DTC
manufacturer is concerned with its production policy and the product’s price charged
to the consumer.
2.1 Joint Economic Lot-sizing Problem (JELP)
A considerate amount of attention has been paid to the research on the single-product
JELP, which generally deals with the following scenario: in a two-echelon supply chain
consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, the retailer faces deterministic demand for
an item and places orders from the manufacturer; the manufacturer produces the item in
lots of a fixed quantity with a set-up cost for each lot. Each production lot is delivered
to the retailer in several shipments with a fixed order/delivery cost per shipment; the
holding costs per unit per time unit for the manufacturer and the retailer are known.
In JELP models, the manufacturer and the retailer work in a cooperative manner to
determine the production lot-size and the delivery schedule based on the minimization
of the integrated total cost function for the whole supply chain, rather than optimizing
their cost functions individually. Some additional assumptions are commonly used
12
in developing basic JELP models, which are (1) shortages are not allowed; (2) the
planning horizon is infinite; and (3) the production rate is greater than the demand rate.
The literature on basic JELP models evolved from a simple model with infinite pro-
duction rate and lot-for-lot policy (Goyal, 1977) to a united framework with finite pro-
duction rate which was used to compare various complex shipment policies (Ben-Daya,
Darwish, & Ertogral, 2008). Several types of shipment policies have been proposed:
lot-for-lot policy, equal-sized shipment policy, geometric policy, and a combination of
equal-sized and geometric shipments policies.
Goyal (1977) is one of the first papers dealing with the JELP problem. He develops
an integrated inventory model for a single supplier-single buyer problem assuming an
infinite production rate and a lot-for-lot delivery policy. That is, each production lot
is delivered to the retailer in a single shipment. Banerjee (1986a) generalizes Goyal’s
(1977) model by relaxing the infinite production rate assumption while retaining the lot-
for-lot delivery policy. He examines a joint total relevant cost model for a single vendor,
single buyer production inventory system, and concludes that joint determination of the
economic lot size for the vendor and buyer can substantially reduce the total relevant
cost for the whole supply chain.
Goyal (1988) extends Banerjee’s (1986a) model by relaxing the lot-for-lot delivery
policy assumption and proposes a delayed equal-sized shipment policy, i.e., each pro-
duction lot is delivered to the retailer in several equal-sized shipments, but shipments
are not allowed until the entire production lot has been produced. Banerjee and Kim
(1995), as well as Lu (1995), further extend Goyal’s (1988) model and propose non-
delayed equal-sized shipment policies. Shipments are allowed during the production
13
process. Equal-sized shipment models are also proposed in other studies, such as Ha
and Kim (1997) and Kim and Ha (2003).
Compared with the lot-for-lot policy, the equal-size shipment policy may deliver
products to the retailer more frequently with smaller delivery sizes, thus reducing the
holding cost for both the manufacturer and the retailer. Although this may substantially
increase transportation costs, the reduction in holding costs can be sufficiently large to
compensate for the increase in transportation costs. It has been shown that equal-size
shipment policy can achieve a lower total relevant cost as compared with the lot-for-lot
policy (Banerjee, 1986a).
Researchers further suggest that successive shipments from a production lot are
not necessary equal-sized but can increase with a growth factor λ. Such a policy is
called a geometric policy. Goyal (1995) is one of the first to propose such a policy,
but he simplifies the growth factor λ to be the ratio of production rate to the demand
rate, P/D. Hill (1997) relaxes this restriction, treating λ as a decision variable, and
develops a heuristic method to search for the value of λ and the number of shipments.
He numerically shows that the geometric policy is superior to the equal-sized shipment
policy.
Note that the growth factor λ in a geometric policy is assumed to be constant during
the production cycle. Hill (1999) relaxes this assumption and shows that a structure of
geometric-then-equal sized shipments provide the optimal solution. For each produc-
tion lot, the first m shipments increase in size with a growth factor of λ and then the
remaining shipments are equal-sized. The production lot size, total number of ship-
ments per production lot, as well as m and λ, are determined by a proposed solution
14
method in order to minimize the total relevant supply chain cost.
Although Hill’s (1999) model can determine the optimal solution, it is too com-
plicated to effectively take into account other practical considerations such as product
quality, lead time control, and set-up cost reduction. Also, in practice, it is not easy to
manage the shipments using the structure proposed by Hill (1999). In order to overcome
these limitations, Goyal and Nebebe (2000) propose a simplified geometric-then-equal
sized policy, i.e., the first shipment is small and each of the remaining shipment sizes
is equal to P/D times the first shipment size. In other words, it is a special case of Hill
(1999) with m = 2 and λ = P/D.
To study and summarize the performance of different shipment policies, Ben-Daya,
Darwish and Ertogral (2008) provide a comprehensive review of JELP models and
further proposed a unified framework for the basic JELP model to accommodate and
compare all the policies proposed by previous researchers. They find that the simpli-
fied geometric-then-equal sized policy proposed by Goyal and Nebebe (2000) provides
good solutions which are very close to the optimal solution proposed by Hill (1999) 3.
The basic JELP model has been extended in several aspects by researchers to better
address the reality of supply chain management. These extensions are outlined below:
(1) Consideration of stochastic demand (Ben-Daya & Hariga, 2004; Ouyang, Wu,
& Hu, 2004), stock-dependent demand (Sajadieh, Thorstenson, & Akbari-Jokar, 2009)
or price-dependent demand (Jokar & Sajadieh, 2009). For example, Ben-Daya and
Hariga (2004) consider the single vendor, single buyer integrated production inventory
3In their examples, simplified geometric-then-equal sized policy is only about 0.6% inferior to the
respective optimal solutions.
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problem, and assume that market demand is stochastic and that delivery lead time varies
linearly with the lot size. They propose a simple procedure to obtain an approximate
solution for a continuous review inventory policy under this scenario, and illustrate it
with numerical examples.
(2) Extension to the one-manufacturer multiple-retailers situation (Affisco, Nasri,
& Paknejad, 1991; Affisco, Pakejad, & Nasri, 1993; C. Chan & Kingsman, 2007;
Hoque, 2011; Joglekar & Tharthare, 1990; Lu, 1995; H. Siajadi, R. Ibrahim, & P.
Lochert, 2006; Viswanathan & Piplani, 2001; Yau & Chiou, 2004). For example, Sia-
jadi, Ibrahim and Lochert (2006) consider a situation when one type of item from a
single manufacturer is distributed to multiple retailers. They propose an exact solution
for the two-retailer case, but only an approximate solution procedure for the more than
two-retailer case.
(3) Incorporating some practical aspects, such as setup & order cost reduction(Chang,
Ouyang, Wu, & Ho, 2004; Nasri, Paknejad, & Affisco, 1991), production quality (Dar-
wish, 2005; Huang, 2002), and lead time control (Chang, et al., 2004; Hoque & Goyal,
2006; Pan & Yang, 2002). In some studies, several realistic factors are examined si-
multaneously. For example, Hoque (2011) relaxes several unrealistic assumptions in
the existing literature, including unlimited capacities of the transport equipment and
retailer’s storage, insignificant set up and transportation times, and unlimited lead time
and batch sizes (Hoque, 2011).
(4) Extensions to more than two-echelon supply chains (Ben-Daya & As’ad, 2006;
Khouja, 2003; Lee, 2005; Muson & Rosenblatt, 2001; Nikandish, Eshghi, & Torabi,
2009). Most of the extensions in this direction consider a three-echelon supply chain
16
including a supplier, a manufacturer and a retailer. The supplier provides raw materials
to the manufacturer which converts raw materials into a final product and sends them
to the retailer using an equal-size shipment policy. Some of these studies (e.g. Nikan-
dish, Eshghi, & Torabi, 2009) further investigate the case of a single supplier, several
manufacturers and multiple retailers.
Although it is shown by Hill (1999) that the geometric-then-equal sized shipment
policy is the optimal structure for the JELP model, almost all the extensions to the basic
JELP model are based on the lot-for-lot or equal-sized shipments policies. There are
several reasons for this. First, analysis of the extension to the geometric policy or the
geometric-then-equal sized shipment models, or even to the simplified geometric-then
equal sized shipment models, is cumbersome, and the results are usually too complex
to be used by practicing managers.
Secondly, the equal-sized shipment policies provide closed-form solutions which
are close to the optima. Ben-Daya, Darwish and Ertogral (2008) show that solutions
to the equal-sized shipment policies are close to optimal. In their examples, when the
parameters of the system (such as holding and setup costs) increase to large values, the
inferiority of the equal-sized shipment policy may decrease to less than 2%.
Finally, the equal-sized shipment policy is much easier to use in practice, such as
designing warehouse capacities or truck load sizes (for example, Kim and Ha (2003)
show that equal-size shipment policy can easily standardize the size of the transporta-
tion vehicle). In contrast, the geometric-then-equal sized shipment policy, changing the
shipment sizes over time, are usually impractical. In fact, equal-size shipment policies
are much more widely used in real world manufacturing and retailing than the geomet-
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ric policy and the geometric-then-equal sized shipment policies.
In other words, an equal-sized shipment policy provides good approximation to the
optimal solution. Under such a policy, it is much easier to incorporate a number of
practical considerations, which is useful in management practice. Therefore, we adopt
the equal-sized shipment policy in this thesis.
2.2 Joint Pricing and Inventory Control
The other stream of research related to this thesis is the research on retailer’s problems
in joint pricing and inventory control. This stream of research considers the follow-
ing scenario: a retailer faces a price-sensitive demand from consumers; it orders goods
from the manufacturer and sells them to the consumers. The planning horizon may
be a single period, a finite number of periods, or infinite; and the retailer decides the
ordering and pricing policies at the beginning of each period to maximize its expected
profit. Extensive research has been done in this area involving various scenarios and as-
sumptions, but can be largely characterized by the assumed demand type. Chan, Shen,
Simchi-Levi and Swann (2004) provide a comprehensive review of this area of research.
Here we provide a review of the literature most relevant to this thesis, especially those
studies published after the Chan et. al. (2004)’ review.
Two demand types are adopted in the literature: deterministic demand and stochas-
tic demand. The proto models with deterministic demand are extended from the EOQ
model by considering price as a decision variable (Whitin, 1955). Most of these models
assume that demand is a linear function of price (e.g. Whitin, 1955; Pekelman, 1974;
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Lai, 1990), a concave function of price (e.g. Biller, Chan and Simchi-Levi, 2002), or a
general decreasing function of price (e.g. Smith & Achabal, 1998).
Most of recent research on the joint pricing and inventory control problems focuses
on the stochastic demand environment rather than the deterministic one. The proto
models with stochastic demand are extended from the classical news-vendor model,
by considering price as a decision variable. Most of such models assume that demand
has a Poisson distribution, while a few of them assume that demand has a general
distributional form. These models are based on either continuous review or periodic
review control policies.
Chen and Simchi-Levi (2004 b) develop a periodic review model over an infinite
horizon and show that an (s, S, p) policy is optimal under the “symmetric k-convexity”
condition4 of the profit function, where s is the reorder point, S is the order-up-to level
and p is the retail price which is dependent on the inventory level at the beginning of
each period. They then extend their model to the continuous review case and show that
an (s, S, p) policy is optimal without the condition of symmetric k-convexity (Chen &
Simchi-Levi, 2006).
The (s, S, p) policy is also shown by Chen and Simchi-Levi (2004 a), as well as
Chen, Ray and Song (2006), to be optimal in the periodic review finite horizon setting
when the demand function is additive. That is, the demand consists of two components,
a deterministic part which is a function of the price and an additive random perturba-
tion. However, when the demand function is not additive, the (s, S, p) policy is not
4“A real-valued function of f is called symmetric k-convex for k ≥ 0, if for any x0 ≤ x1 and
λ ∈ [0, 1], f((1−λ)x0+λx1) ≤ (1−λ)f(x0)+λf(x1)+max {λ, 1− λ} · k” (Chen & Simchi-Levi,
2004a, p.891)
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necessarily optimal and it is extremely cumbersome to analyze the resulting maximiza-
tion problem. They used the concept of symmetric k-convexity to prove that an (s, S,
A, p) policy 5 is optimal in this case.
Subsequent to the work of Chen and Simchi-Levi (2004 a, b; 2006), several studies
on the optimality of (s, S, p) type policies have been conducted. For example, Song,
Ray, and Boyaci (2006) deal with the case of multiplicative demand model with lost
sales. They proved the optimality of the (s, S, p) policy. Chao and Zhou (2006) investi-
gate an infinite-horizon continuous review system with a Poisson demand process. Yin
and Rajaram (2007) extend the results of Chen and Simchi-Levi (2004 a, b) to a finite
horizon and periodic review system with Markovian demand. For the additive demand
model, they show the existence of an optimal (s, S, p) type feedback policy. Huh and
Janakiraman (2008) show the optimality of (s, S, p) policy in periodic review systems
under both backordering and lost-sales assumptions.
Some recent research (e.g. Chen, Wu, & Yao, 2010; Wei, 2010; Zhang & Chen,
2006) further relax the assumption of a constant price for each period in the traditional
joint pricing and inventory control problems, allowing the retail price to change dy-
namically, i.e., dynamic pricing with consideration of inventory control. For example,
Zhang and Chen (2006) study a periodic review model over a finite horizon. The de-
mand is assumed to be stochastic and have a distribution dependent on the retail price,
but “one or more parameters of the demand distribution are unknown with a known
prior distribution that is chosen from the natural conjugate family” (Zhang & Chen,
5“(Define) a set At ∈ [st, (st + St)/2], possibly empty depending on the problem instance. When
the inventory level xt at the beginning of period t is less than st or xt ∈ At, an order of size St − xt is
placed. Otherwise, no order is placed” (Chen & Simchi-Levi, 2006, p.324)
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2006). They provide a Bayesian dynamic program formulation and characterize the
structure of an optimal policy.
2.3 Integration of Pricing, Production and Inventory Decisions
As mentioned above, research on the JELP focuses on the cooperation of the manu-
facturer and the retailer(s) to minimize the total cost for the supply chain, representing
vertical integration within the supply chain. Research on joint pricing and inventory
control problem, on the other hand, focuses on the maximization of profit for the re-
tailer via integration of the pricing and inventory decisions, representing horizontal
integration of the supply chain. However, very few models are formulated to fill the
gap between these two streams of research and describe how the manufacturer and the
retailer(s) can cooperate with each other and simultaneously make decisions concern-
ing production lot size, delivery schedule, and retail pricing, in order to maximize the
total profit for the whole supply chain.
To the best of our knowledge, Jokar and Sajadieh (2009) are among the first to ex-
plore this issue. They propose a JELP model with a price-sensitive market demand.
Using an analytical approach, they obtain a closed-form approximate solution for de-
termining the order quantity and the retail price. Nevertheless their work is limited by
the adoption of a lot-for-lot production/delivery policy. This setting makes the produc-
tion lot equal to the retailer’s order quantity, which significantly simplify the problem.
However, as shown by previous studies (Banerjee & Kim, 1995; Lu, 1995 et. al.), the
equal-sized shipment policy is superior to the lot-for-lot delivery policy. Therefore, it
would be worthwhile for us to adopt an equal-sized shipment policy and reexamine this
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problem.
There are some studies providing useful insights into this issue, although they do
not examine it directly. For example, Zahir and Sarker (1991) analyze the pricing, eco-
nomic ordering policies, and the production lot-sizing policy for a supply chain with
a single manufacturer and multiple regional wholesalers. The products are assumed
to be delivered on a lot for lot basis. They obtain the optimum EOQs for the whole-
salers first. And then they propose that, to minimize its cost, the manufacturer would
encourage the wholesalers to order in quantities different from their respective EOQs
by providing compensation to offset the wholesalers’ increased costs. Although this
study finds ways to maximizes the wholesalers’ profits and minimize the producer’s
cost respectively, it does not provide solutions to maximize the profit of the whole sup-
ply chain. Instead of making decisions simultaneously in a cooperative manner, the
wholesalers and the producer make decision sequentially and focus on their own costs
and profit.
Another example is the work of Boyaci and Gallego (2002). They analyze the
integration of pricing and inventory replenishment policies for a supply chain consisting
of one wholesaler and one or more geographically dispersed retailers. They show that
“a solution that maximizes channel profits can be interpreted as consignment selling ”6
(Boyaci & Gallego, 2002, p.95). They also show that when the demand rate is large
enough, separating the pricing and lot sizing decision is near optimal. However, they
assume that the wholesaler either obtains the product from other producers or produces
it at an infinite rate. Therefore, they fail to cover the production process and incorporate
6The retailers pay the wholesaler only as and when the products are sold. And, the wholesaler takes
back all the unsold products from the retailers.
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the production lot size decision in their model.
23
3 Single-Manufacturer Single-Retailer (SMSR)
Single-manufacturer single-retailer supply chains are common in the business environ-
ment, especially for small businesses. For example, the AGAS Manufacturing Group is
a local clothing manufacturer which distributes its product via its own distribution cen-
ter in Philadelphia. In such a supply chain, the manufacturer and the retailer, being the
same corporate entity, naturally cooperate with each other. Other single-manufacturer
single-retailer supply chains are not naturally centralized because the manufacturer and
the retailer are different organizations. Whether supply chains are naturally centralized
or not, supply chain managers are concerned about making the centralized decisions.
Especially, for supply chains which are not naturally centralized, it is important for the
managers to examine both the centralized and decentralized decisions and, thus, resolve
profit sharing issues via negotiation.
In this chapter, we focus on a single product, single-manufacturer single-retailer,
infinite horizon model, assuming that demand is price-dependent and deterministic.
We first describe the modeling assumptions and notation in section 3.1. In section
3.2, the model of a centralized supply chain, where the manufacturer and the retailer
work in a cooperative manner to maximize the channel profits for the entire supply
chain, is developed, followed by a proposed solution algorithm. We next analyze the
decentralized supply chain in section 3.3. In section 3.4, we discuss revenue sharing
between the manufacturer and the retailer in a centralized supply chain and the social
benefit of centralization associated with different channel structures. We provide some
numerical examples and sensitivity analysis to illustrate the proposed algorithm and
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compare the results of centralized and decentralized supply chains in section 3.5.
3.1 Assumptions
We consider the following scenario in this chapter: a manufacturer produces a product
in discrete lots at a production rate P with a setup cost of S per batch and a production
cost of C per unit. For each production lot, the manufacturer delivers the product to the
retailer in n equal-sized shipments with a fixed cost of F per shipment plus a variable
cost of V per unit. The retailer pays the transportation cost, in addition to an ordering
cost of O per shipment. The objective is to determine the production lot size Q, equal
shipment sizes of q, the number of shipments per production cycle, n, and the retail
price, pr, in order to maximize the profit of the entire supply chain.
The following assumptions are made in this chapter:
(1) D = a−bpr; where the parameters a, b > 0 are known;
(2) The planning horizon is infinite;
(3) Shortages are not allowed;
(4) The production rate P is greater than the demand rate D;
(5) The holding cost per unit per time unit of the retailer (Hr) is not less than the
holding cost per unit per time unit of the manufacturer (Hm);
(6) Delivery lead time is zero or negligible.
Assumption (1) is widely used in the literature to represent the relationship between
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the retail price and market demand (as discussed in section 2.2 of this thesis). To simply
our analysis, we use a linear demand function in this thesis. However, our analysis
could be easily extended to accommodate other retail demand functions. Assumption
(2) is commonly used in JELP models. Assumptions (3) and (4) are made to ensure that
all the demand can be fulfilled, to guarantee consumer satisfaction. Assumption (5) is
reasonable, since the holding cost usually increases as a product moves down the supply
chain, due to the value added at each echelon. Assumption (6) is used for presentation
and analysis simplicity only. Including lead time in our model does not make any
differences in the qualitative results and the properties derived in this research.
3.2 Centralized Supply Chain
3.2.1 Model Formulation
Note thatD is a function of pr. Thus, the decision variables in our model are q, n, pr, Q
and the production cycle length, T . Once three of these variables are chosen, the other
two will also be determined, since we have Q = nq and T = Q/D. Therefore, in this
section, we analyze how the manufacturer and the retailer can work in a cooperative
manner to decide n, q, and pr to maximize the profit of entire supply chain. To do so,
we first examine the inventory levels of both parties in the supply chain, so that we
can develop their inventory holding costs. We then formulate the profit function for
both parties as well as for the entire supply chain, and provide solutions to the profit
maximization problem for the entire supply chain.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the inventory patterns for the manufacturer, the retailer and the
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Figure 3.1: Inventory pattern in a single-manufacturer single-retailer environment
27
entire supply chain in an inventory cycle. We focus on the inventory level of the entire
supply chain first, which is the sum of the inventory levels of the manufacturer and the
retailer. Note that the manufacturer has to begin its production cycle at q/P time unit
before the retailer depletes its inventory (to have q unit ready when the retailer depletes
its inventory and needs replenishment). Thus, the total inventory of the whole supply
chain system (held by the retailer) is at the beginning of each production lot. This is the
inventory left over at the retailer when the manufacturer starts to produce a batch. Note
that the inventory of the system increases at a rate of (P − D) during the production
process, which has duration of n·q/P . Thus, the maximum inventory level of the whole
system (at the end of the production process) is (P −D) · n · q/P as shown in Figure
3.1. Therefore, we have the average inventory of the system is
Is =
D · q
P
+
(P −D) · n · q
2P
. (3.1)
As shown in Figure 3.1, the retailer has inventory level of q at the beginning of each
order cycle and replenishes when it depletes its inventory. Thus, average inventory level
for the retailer is
Ir =
q
2
. (3.2)
The average inventory level of the manufacturer, which is the difference of those of
the entire supply chain and the retailer, can be written as
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Im =
D · q
P
+
(P −D) · q · n
2P
− q
2
. (3.3)
Based on the inventory pattern analysis above, we now develop the profit functions
for the retailer, the manufacturer and the entire supply chain respectively. The retailer
has a sale’s revenue of D · pr per year, and it has to pay for the purchase cost of the
products D · pw, ordering cost of O ·D/q, transportation cost of F ·D/q + V ·D, and
inventory cost of Hr · I . Thus, the profit of the retailer per year can be written as
pir = D · (pr − pw − V )− (O + F ) ·D
q
− Hr · q
2
. (3.4)
The manufacturer has a sale’s revenue of D · pw per year, and it has to pay for the
production cost of D · C, setup cost of S · D/(n · q), and inventory cost of Hm · Im.
Using equation (3.3), we can write the profit of the manufacturer per year as
pim = D · (pw − C)− S ·D
n · q −Hm
{
D · q
P
+
(P −D) · q · n
2P
− q
2
}
. (3.5)
Thus, the profit of the entire supply chain, which is the sum of the profits of the
retailer and the manufacturer, is
pis = D·(pr − C − V )−D · [S + n · (O + F )]
q · n −
q
2
{
Hm
[
(2− n) ·D
P
+ n− 1
]
+Hr
}
.
(3.6)
In a centralized supply chain, the manufacturer and the retailer work in a coopera-
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tive manner to maximize the profit of the entire supply chain by controlling n, q and pr.
Therefore, the optimization problem for the centralized supply chain can be formulated
as follows:
Maximize
n,q,pr
pis
s.t. D = a− bpr
D < P
D, pr, P > 0
n ∈ {1, 2, 3, ...} .
(3.7)
To solve the above maximization problem, we first relax the constraint of n to be
a positive integer. We will incorporate this constraint later. For any given D, q and n
must satisfy the following first order conditions:
∂pis
∂q
=
D
q2
[S + n · (O + F )
n
− Hm
2
[
(2− n) ·D
P
+ n− 1
]
− Hr
2
= 0 (3.8)
∂pis
∂n
=
D · S
q · n2 −
q ·Hm
2
[
1− D
P
]
= 0. (3.9)
From equation (3.8), we have
D · S
q · n +
D · (O + F )
q
=
q
2
{
Hm
[
(2− n) ·D
P
+ n− 1
]
+Hr
}
. (3.10)
The left hand side of equation (3.10) is the sum of the manufacturer’s set up cost
and the retailer’s ordering and fixed transportation costs; whereas the right hand side is
30
the inventory cost of the entire supply chain. This means that when the optimal solution
is achieved, the delivery lot size, q, will be adjusted to “balance” the costs on the left
hand side, which is decreasing with q, and the inventory costs on the right hand side,
which is increasing with q.
From equation (3.9), we have
D · S
q · n =
n · q ·Hm
2
[
1− D
P
]
. (3.11)
Note that the left hand side of equation (3.11) is the manufacturer’s setup cost,
whereas the right hand side is a part of the manufacturer’s inventory holding cost, which
is affected by n. Thus adjusting n only does not affect the cost of the retailer, but an in-
crease in n will lower the manufacturer’s average setup cost, simultaneously increasing
the production lot size and, thus, increase its inventory holding cost. Again, when the
optimal solutions are achieved, n will be adjusted to “balance” the costs on both sides
of equation (3.11).
Since n and q are positive, equations (3.8) and (3.9) have a unique solution as fol-
lows:
nˆ =
√
S
O + F
Hr +Hm
(
2D
P
− 1)
Hm
(
1− D
P
) , (3.12)
qˆ =
√
2D · (O + F )
Hr +Hm
(
2D
P
− 1) . (3.13)
Note that, for any givenD, (nˆ , qˆ) is the unique solution obtained from the first order
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optimality conditions, as shown by previous work (e.g. Kim and Ha, 2003, p.5). Also,
the total cost of the entire supply chain is jointly convex in n and q, hence, (nˆ , qˆ) is
the optimal solution, when D is given. Once D (as a function of pr) is determined, the
corresponding optimal n and q are unique and determined. Note that the market demand
D is determined by the retail price pr. Therefore, the maximization problem 3.7 on
page 29 can be rewritten as a maximization problem with only decision variable pr.
Substituting (3.10), (3.12) and (3.13) into the objective function, we have an equivalent
objective function with only variable pr, i.e.
pics (pr) = (a− b · pr) [pr − C − V ]−
√
2(a− b · pr) · S ·Hm
(
1− a− b · pr
P
)
−
√
2(a− b · pr) · (O + F ) ·
[
Hr +Hm
(
2
(
a− b · pr
P
)
− 1
)]
.(3.14)
Thus, the problem now becomes choosing pr in order to maximize pics. To better
describe the properties of this maximization problem, and also for notational simplicity,
we define:
δ =
a
b
− C − V − 2
√
(O + F ) ·Hm
P
,
η =
√
1− 2
P
(
b2 · S ·Hm
4
)1/3
.
Note that the first term in δ, a/b, is the maximum feasible retail price, which reflects
market profitability; i.e. the higher the a/b value, the higher the market profitability.
The other terms in δ describe part of the unit cost of selling the product to the market.
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Therefore, δ in fact reflects the profitability of the product. Based on the analysis in
Appendix 6.2.3, we develop following propositions.
Proposition 1. The product is not profitable if δ ≤ P
b
(1− η3) . If this condition holds,
the entire supply chain cannot achieve a positive profit.
The idea behind Proposition 1 is that the supply chain would not be able to generate
any positive profit from a product, if the retail price is less than the average unit cost.
To better interpret Proposition 1, we can rewrite the condition as follows:
a
b
≤ C + V + 2
√
(O + F ) ·Hm
P
+
P
b
1−
√1− 2
P
(
b2 · S ·Hm
4
)1/33 .
Note that the left hand side, a/b, is the maximum feasible retail price, and the right
hand side reflects the average per-unit cost, where C and V are fixed parameters that
are independent of the supply chain decisions. The remaining terms on right-hand side
of the above expression represent sum of the other relevant per unit costs minimized
by adjusting the supply chain decisions. Thus, to some extent, the right-hand side
represents the minimum feasible per-unit cost. Hence, Proposition 1 indicates that, if
the maximum feasible retail price is not greater than the minimum feasible per-unit
cost, the supply chain profit cannot be positive.
Supply chain managers may use Proposition 1 in an approximate but more intuitive
way. Practitioners are usually able to estimate an approximate range of each cost factor.
For example, a manager may be able to state with some degree of confidence that the
holding cost would be about 10% to 15% of the total production cost. Thus, he/she
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can compare the estimated per-unit cost with the maximum feasible price, a/b, for
ascertaining the profitability of the product in question.
Proposition 1 shows that, when the product profitability is lower than or equal to
a certain level, the best strategy for the manufacturer and the retailer is to not deal
with this product. In contrast, if the product profitability is very high, the manufacturer
and the retailer should be willing to provide as much of the product as possible to the
market to increase their respective profits. This characteristic is shown and described
in following proposition.
Proposition 2. If δ ≥ P
b
(1 + η3), the profit of the entire supply chain is maximized by
choosing pr = a−Pb . That is, the manufacturer will keep producing the product con-
tinuously without any interruptions. In this case, optimal n 7→ ∞and q =
√
2P ·(O+F )
Hr+Hm
.
When pr = a−Pb , D 7−→ P , the manufacturer has to use all its production capacity
to produce a single product. In this case, the manufacturer will keep producing and
never have any idle time. Thus, the production lot size and n will both be infinite. It
is easy to derive the optimal q, using equation (3.13). The corresponding supply chain
profit under this condition is given by
pis = P ·
(
a− P
b
− C − V
)
−
√
2(O + F ) · P · (Hm +Hr). (3.15)
When the product profitability δ is neither as low as the condition stated in Propo-
sition 1, not as high as the condition stated in Proposition 2, the manufacturer and the
retailer have to determine the retail price in order to maximize the profit of the entire
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supply chain. In this situation, we outline following proposition.
Proposition 3. If P
b
≤ δ < P
b
(1 + η3), the objective function is strictly concave in(
a
b
− P ·(1+η)
2b
, a
b
− P
2b
]
; If P
b
(1− η3) < δ ≤ P
b
, the objective function is strictly concave
in
[
a
b
− P
2b
, a
b
− P ·(1−η)
2b
)
. In these situations, the maximization problem has a unique
inner local maximum solution, p¯r. Specifically,

a
b
− P
2b
< p¯r <
a
b
− P
2b
(1− η) if P
b
(1− η3) < δ < P
b
p¯r =
a
b
− P
2b
if δ = P
b
a
b
− P
2b
> p¯r >
a
b
− P
2b
(1 + η) if P
b
(1 + η3) > δ > P
b
Based on the above propositions, a binary-search algorithm are developed in section
3.2.2 to search the optimal retail price. Once the optimal retail price is reached, as
discussed above, the objective function is concave on the number of shipments n and
delivery lot size q. Thus, the corresponding optimal q is determined by equation (3.13);
and the optimal n is an integer around nˆ in equation (3.12), either bnˆc or dnˆe.
3.2.2 Solution Algorithm
Based on propositions 1, 2 and 3, we propose a procedure for finding a solution to the
maximization problem (3.7). We first calculate δ and η. Based on the calculated δ
and η, we apply the corresponding proposition. If δ ≥ P
b
(1 + η3) or δ ≤ P
b
(1− η3),
an optimal solution can be obtained immediately. Otherwise, based on proposition 3,
a binary search method is used to search for optimal retail price in the corresponding
interval. In particular, the following steps are used in this algorithm:
35
Step 1. Calculate δ and η. If δ ≥ P
b
(1 + η3), then p∗r =
a−P
b
, n∗ 7→ ∞, q∗ =√
2P ·(O+F )
Hr+Hm
; If δ ≤ P
b
(1− η3), then stop; If δ = P
b
, then p¯r =
a−P/2
b
and go to step 4;
If P
b
(1− η3) < δ < P
b
, then go to step 2; otherwise, go to step 3;
Step 2. Do a binary search over
[
a
b
− P
2b
, a
b
− P ·(1−η)
2b
)
to search p¯r such that 2p¯r −
√
S ·Hm (P−2D¯)√
2D¯·P(P−D¯)
= 2a
b
− δ, where D¯ = a− b · p¯r; go to step 4;
Step 3. Do a binary search over
(
a
b
− P ·(1+η)
2b
, a
b
− P
2b
]
to search p¯r such that 2p¯r −
√
S ·Hm (P−2D¯)√
2D¯·P(P−D¯)
= 2a
b
− δ, where D¯ = a− b · p¯r; go to step 4;
Step 4. Calculate D¯ = a− b · p¯r, n˜ =
√
S
O+F
Hr+Hm( 2D¯P −1)
Hm(1− D¯P )
, q¯ =
√
2D¯·(O+F )
Hr+Hm( 2D¯P −1)
;
using equation (3.6), if pis (p¯r, bn˜c , q¯) ≥ pis (p¯r, dn˜e , q¯), then n¯ = bn˜c, otherwise,
n¯ = dn˜e; calculate corresponding pis = pis (p¯r, n¯, q¯); go to step 5;
Step 5. If pis ≥ max {pis, 0}, then p∗r = p¯r, n∗ = n¯, q∗ = q¯; if pis ≤ 0, then stop;
otherwise, p∗r =
a−P
b
, n∗ 7→ ∞, q∗ =
√
2P ·(O+F )
Hr+Hm
.
3.3 Decentralized Supply Chain
The discussion in the previous section is based on the assumption that the manufacturer
and the retailer work in a cooperative manner to maximize the profit of the entire supply
chain. In reality, the manufacturer and the retailer are often most concerned about their
own individual profits and not necessarily about that for the whole system, especially
when one of them has the negotiating power to impose its own independently derived
optimal policy. In this section, we discuss the situation when they work in a non-
cooperative manner. For presentation clarity, we use superscripts c and d to denote the
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parameters for a centralized or a decentralized supply chain, respectively.
3.3.1 Model Formulation
Clearly, the wholesale price, pw, affects the profit share of the entities in the supply
chain. The manufacturer would prefer a higher pw, whereas the retailer wishes it to be
as low as possible. The manufacturer and the retailer may negotiate with each other
to determine the wholesale price, pw, to decide their individual profit levels. Once pw
is established, the retailer has to decide on the retail price and its economic order size
q; and the manufacturer needs to determine its production lot size Q or the number
of shipment per batch, n. Note that the retailer’s decisions are independent of the
manufacturer’s decisions, whereas the latter has to make its decisions based on the
retailer’s choices. The retailer faces the following maximization problem
Max
q, pr
(a− b · pr) · (pr − pw − V )− (O + F ) · (a− b · pr)
q
− Hr · q
2
s.t. P > a− b · pr > 0
pr > 0
q > 0. (3.16)
From (3.16), the optimal q for any given pr can be written as
q =
√
2 (O + F ) · (a− b · pr)
Hr
. (3.17)
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Thus, based on equation (3.17), maximization problem (3.16) is equivalent to
Max
pr
pidr (pr) = (a− b · pr) · (pr − pw − V )−
√
2Hr · (O + F ) · (a− b · pr)
s.t. pr >
a− P
b
pr <
a
b
. (3.18)
In Appendix 6.2.3, we provide the details of an algorithm to quickly solve the max-
imization problem above. The manufacturer will then make its decision on the produc-
tion lot size Q (or the shipment schedule n = Q/q) via solving the following problem:
Max
n
pidm = (a− b · pr) ·
{
pw − c− S
n · q −
q ·Hm
2
[
(2− n)
P
+ n− 1
]}
s.t. n ∈ {1, 2, ...} . (3.19)
Since ∂
2pim
∂n2
= −2 (a−b·pr)S
n3q
< 0, pim is concave in n, and is maximized at either
bn¯cor dn¯e, where
n¯ =
√
2 (a− b · pr) · S
q ·
√
Hm
(
1− a−b·pr
P
) . (3.20)
3.3.2 Comparison with Centralized Supply Chain
As discussed above, the manufacturer and the retailer cooperate with each other to
maximize the total channel profit in the centralized supply chain, whereas, in the de-
centralized supply chain, they only focus on their own respective profits. Under this
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mechanism, the centralized supply chain has higher total channel profit than the decen-
tralized supply chain. In the former case, the retail price is determined by maximizing
(3.14) while the retail price in the latter case is determined by the maximization prob-
lem (3.18). Denote the optimal retail price in centralized supply chain and decentralized
supply chain by pcr and p
d
r respectively. Note that, as shown in (3.21), pi
c
s in (3.14) can be
reorganized and written as the sum of the retailer’s profit, pidr , in (3.18) and a decreasing
function of pr, f (pr), as follows:
pics (pr) = pi
d
r (pr) + f (pr) , (3.21)
where f (pr) = (a− b · pr)
{
pw − C −
√
2Hm
[√
S
a−b·pr − SP +
√(
2
(
O+F
P
)− O+F
a−b·pr
)]}
.
It is easy to verify that
f(pr) ≥ 0,
∂f(pr)
∂pr
< 0.
Consequently, we outline the following proposition on the relationship between pcr and
pdr .
Proposition 4. The optimal retail price in a centralized supply chain, pcr, is not greater
than the retail price in a decentralized supply chain, pdr . Moreover, the difference be-
tween pdr and p
c
r, p
d
r − pcr, is increasing with the wholesale price, pw.
Proof. If pcr > p
d
r , then f
(
pdr
)
> f (pcr). Note that pi
d
r
(
pdr
) ≥ pidr (pcr) . Therefore, if
pcr > p
d
r , pi
c
s
(
pdr
)
= pidr
(
pdr
)
+ f
(
pdr
)
> pidr (p
c
r) + f (p
c
r) = pi
c
s (p
c
r), which contradicts
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the fact that pcr maximizes pi
c
s (pr). Moreover, p
c
r is independent of pw; whereas p
d
r is
increasing with pw. Thus, pdr − pcr increases with pw.
3.4 Revenue Sharing and Social Benefit
Based on the above discussion, the centralized supply chain has a higher total channel
profit than the decentralized supply chain. Both the manufacturer and the retailer have
an incentive to cooperate with each other in order to gain higher profits. But, it remains
unclear how the manufacturer and the retailer share the benefit from centralizing the
supply chain decisions. To address this issue, we develop the Nash bargaining equilib-
rium in section 3.4.1, followed by a further discussion on the social benefit issues in
section 3.4.2.
3.4.1 Nash Bargaining Equilibrium
Various solutions have been proposed to solve the bargaining game between two players
(i.e. the manufacturer and the retailer in our case). The bargaining game in cooperative
game theory considers the following problem. There are some feasible outcomes if an
agreement can be reached. If an agreement cannot be reached, a given disagreement
outcome is the result. As discussed earlier, the centralized supply chain has higher
total profit than the decentralized supply chain. Thus, there is an incentive for the
manufacturer and the retailer to negotiate with each other. In this section, we discuss
the bargaining game between the manufacturer and the retailer.
One of the most important approaches for solving the bargaining game without con-
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sideration of negotiation power is the Nash bargaining equilibrium. John Nash (Nash,
1951) proposed that a solution to the bargaining game should satisfy certain axioms:
(1) invariant to affine transformations or invariant to equivalent utility representations;
(2) Pareto optimality; (3) independence of irrelevant alternatives; and (4) symmetry.
Based on these axioms, the game players will seek to maximize the Nash product,
which is defined as (u1 − d1) · (u2 − d2) where u1 and u2 are the bargaining outcomes
for the two game players respectively and d1 and d2 are outcomes if they cannot reach
an agreement.
In our case, if the two game players, the manufacturer and the retailer, reach an
agreement and thus operate in a centralized supply chain environment, the bargaining
outcomes for them are picm and pi
c
r respectively. If they cannot reach an agreement, that
is, the supply chain is decentralized, their outcomes are pidm and pi
d
r respectively. In other
words, the Nash product is
(
picm − pidm
) · (picr − pidr). Thus, the Nash bargaining problem
can be written as
Max
(
picm − pidm
) · (picr − pidr)
s.t. picm + pi
c
r ≤ pics. (3.22)
The Nash bargaining problem above has a unique solution as follows:
picm = pi
d
m +
pics − pids
2
picr = pi
d
r +
pics − pids
2
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Therefore, when the manufacturer and the retailer have equivalent negotiation power,
they equally share the difference between pics and pi
d
s , which is the extra channel benefit
resulting from centralization.
Note that the above discussion does not consider the negotiation power. To develop
generalized Nash bargaining equilibrium with consideration of negotiation power, we
normalize the negotiation power of the manufacturer and the retailer to be α and β,
where α + β = 1. Following previous literature (e.g., Roth, 1979), the generalized
Nash bargaining problem can be summarized as
Max
(
picm − pidm
)α · (picr − pidr)β
s.t. picm + pi
c
r ≤ pics. (3.23)
This generalized Nash bargaining problem above has a unique solution as follows:
picm = pi
d
m + α
(
pics − pids
)
picr = pi
d
r + β
(
pics − pids
)
.
Both the Nash bargaining equilibrium and the generalized Nash bargaining equilib-
rium assumes that all parties (the manufacturer and the retailer) are rational. However,
in reality, the manufacturer and/or the retailer might have fairness concerns and, thus,
are boundedly rational. There is some empirical evidence that supply chain coordina-
tion efforts sometimes fail due to fairness concerns in the supply chain (Lim & Ho,
2007; Ho & Zhang, 2008). This issue of fairness concern has received some attention
in the recent supply chain literature. For example, Cui, Raju and Zhang (2007) examine
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the effect of fairness considerations in supply chain coordination, and Su (2008) studies
some aspects of supply chain contracts that arise from the notion of bounded rational-
ity. In addition, Hu (2008) examines a fair and equitable profit sharing mechanism
which allocates supply chain profit according to each party’s contribution (i.e., relevant
cost involved). Chen (2011) investigates the fair sharing of costs and revenue in supply
chains under stochastic demand. The methods used by these two researchers can be
applied and extended to our setting for sharing total supply chain profits in proportion
to each party’s contribution.
It seems important to consider which mechanism, a Nash bargaining equilibrium or
a fair profit allocation, is more reasonable and realistic. This issue, however, is some-
what controversial. Nevertheless, we believe that the choice depends on the fairness
preference and the relative negotiation power of the parties involved. Obviously, the
stronger the fairness preference, the more probable that a fair profit allocation is imple-
mented. Also, when the negotiation powers of the supplier and the retailer are roughly
at parity, a fair profit allocation would be more likely. In contrast, if there is a significant
power imbalance, it is hard to imagine that a fair allocation process would be resorted
to.
3.4.2 Social Benefit
According to proposition 4, centralized decisions in supply chain not only increase the
total channel profit but also benefit the consumers in the form of a lower retail price. In
other words, the manufacturer and the retailer gain more profit in a centralized supply
chain by satisfying more market demand with a lower retail price. Thus, from the
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perspective of social benefit, centralization in a supply chain is not only beneficial to
the manufacturer and the retailer, but also is beneficial to the consumers of the product.
Further more, the wholesale price affects the difference between the optimal cen-
tralized retail price and the decentralized retail price, and, thus, affects the extra channel
benefit resulting from centralization. When the retailer is more powerful than the man-
ufacturer in a decentralized supply chain, the wholesale price will be relatively low
and the decentralized retail price will be closer to the centralized retail price. On the
other hand, if the manufacturer is more powerful than the retailer, the wholesale price
will be relatively high and the decentralized retail price will be further away from the
centralized retail price. Note that the further the decentralized retail price is from the
centralized retail price, the stronger would be the effect of centralization in realizing
extra channel and consumer benefits. Therefore, from the perspective of supply chain
regulation, it is more necessary to centralize supply chains dominated by the manufac-
turer, for enhancing the resulting social benefit.
3.5 Numerical Example and Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, we use a numerical example to illustrate the proposed algorithm for
the centralized supply chain, as well as the solution for the decentralized supply chain.
This example is based on data from a shoe factory in south China. A type of shoes is
produced by this factory and distributed to a retailer for sale. The supply chain parame-
ters are given as follows: C=$10/pair; S=$800/setup; O=$50/order; F=$100/shipment;
V =$1/pair; Hm=$10 per pair per year; Hr=$11 per pair per year; P=20,000 pairs per
year; a=20,000; b=800.
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3.5.1 Centralized Supply Chain
In this section, we consider the situation when the shoe factory and the retailer coop-
erate with each other to maximize the total supply chain profit, i.e. the supply chain is
centralized. The supply chain parameters are computed as
δ =
a
b
− C − V − 2
√
(O + F ) ·Hm
P
=
20, 000
800
− 10− 1− 2
√
(50 + 100)× 10
20, 000
= 13.225,
η =
√
1− 2
P
(
b2 · S ·Hm
4
)1/3
=
√
1− 2
20, 000
(
8002 · 800 · 10
4
)1/3
= 0.9442.
Thus, P
b
(1− η3) < δ < P
b
. Our solution algorithm yields the following results (the
MATLAB code is provided in Appendix 2-1):
n∗ = 2
q∗ = 501 pairs
pr∗ = $18.54 per pair
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The algorithm takes only 6 iterations for obtaining the optimal solution, which is ex-
tremely efficient. The annual demand is 5169 pairs per year and the maximum profit
for the entire supply chain is about $28033 per year.
3.5.2 Decentralized Supply Chain
If the shoe factory and the retailer do not cooperate with each other, but make indepen-
dent decisions to maximize their own profits, then according to our earlier discussion
on decentralized supply chain, we have the following results for this scenario under
different wholesale prices.
Table 1: Results of SMSR decentralized supply chain under different pw
pw pr pi
d
r pi
d
m pi
d
s
12 19.21 24855 2645 27500
13 19.72 20428 6316 26744
14 20.23 16409 9185 25594
15 20.75 12800 11249 24049
16 21.26 9604 12505 22109
17 21.76 6814 13074 19888
18 22.31 4458 12557 17015
19 22.85 2520 11315 13835
20 23.40 1017 9153 10170
As expected, the centralized supply chain yields higher profits for the entire supply
chain than the decentralized case for various levels of pw. Figure 3.2 below shows the
shares of the supply chain profits under different wholesale prices; where the dashed
line represents the profit level for the centralized supply chain.
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Figure 3.2: Profits for SMSR decentralized supply chain
As shown above, in a decentralized supply chain, the profit of the entire supply
chain decrease with increasing wholesale price. Consequently, when the retailer is the
more powerful party and is able to ask for a lower wholesale price, the performance of
the entire supply chain improves. The rationale for this is that, a lower wholesale price
allows the retailer more flexibility to set the retail price. As we can see in Figure 3.2,
when the wholesale price is sufficiently low, the profit of the decentralized supply chain
is close to that of the centralized supply chain.
One important question here is the effect of centralization on the retail price. Table
1 shows that the retail price in a centralized supply chain is always lower than that
of a decentralized supply chain. It indicates that the centralized supply chain yields
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higher consumer benefit, since it offers lower retail price with higher market demand.
As shown in this example, compared with the traditional non-cooperative setting, the
cooperation of the manufacturer and the retailer will lower the retail price, increase
market demand and improve the profit of the entire supply chain. Moreover, for the
decentralized supply chain, the entire supply chain is much more efficient when the
retailer is the leader than when it is the follower. In other words, the more powerful the
retailer, the more efficient is the decentralized supply chain.
3.5.3 Sensitivity Analysis
The results of the centralized decisions in a supply chain are dependent on various
factors, including the market demand parameters a and b, production capacity P , and
cost parameters C, O, S, V, F , Hm and Hr. undoubtedly, improving (decreasing) the
values of the cost parameters will increase the total profit of the supply chain. But it is
not so obvious as to how the market factors (i.e. the demand function parameters, a and
b) and the production capacity affect the centralized retail price and the total profit of
the supply chain. In this section, we conduct sensitivity analysis to examine this issue.
(1) Changes in the market factors
To examine the effect of the market factors, we fix the production capacity and other
cost parameters but change the market factors. We examine the retail price and total
supply chain profit for three levels of b and various values of a. The following figures
3.3 and 3.4 show the effect of market factors on the retail price and total supply chain
profit respectively.
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Figure 3.3: Effect of market factors on the retail price
Figure 3.4: Effect of market factors on total supply chain profit
As expected, the higher the value of parameter a, the higher are the retail price and
the total supply chain profit. The higher the value of parameter b, the lower are the
retail price and the total supply chain profit. Note that, market factor a represents the
maximum possible market size. Obviously, the higher the possible market size, the
more profitable the supply chain. Thus, when a is higher, the centralized retail price
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and the total supply chain profit are higher. While for any given a, the lower the value
of b, the more price sensitive are the consumers. Hence, under such a situation, the
manufacturer and the retailer are forced to lower the retail price, resulting in lower
profit level.
(2) Changes in production capacity
To examine the effect of the production capacity, we fix the market factors and the
cost parameters but change the production capacity. We examine the retail price and
total supply chain profit for various values of production capacity, P. Following figures
3.5 and 3.6 below show the effect of production capacity on the retail price and total
supply chain profit respectively.
Figure 3.5: Effect of production capacity on the retail price
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Figure 3.6: Effect of production capacity on total supply chain profit
These figures indicate that a high production capacity does not necessarily bring
high profit in the centralized supply chain. Considering the market factors and the
cost parameters, it is possible that the resulting market demand is much lower than the
production capacity. In this case, improvement of the production capacity does not
generate additional profit.
51
4 Single-Manufacturer Multiple-Retailer (SMMR)
The situations considered in most of the existing literature assume that the demand for
an item is from a single buyer (retailer). In practice, it is not uncommon that a man-
ufacturer produces an item and distributes it to several retailers. For example, Apple
Inc. manufactures the iPhone and sells it via its distribution centers all over the world.
In this situation, the manufacturer and the retailers are naturally centralized. While in
some other cases, the supply chain is not necessarily naturally centralized. For exam-
ple, Sony manufactures PS3 game station and distributes it via some retailers such as
Bestbuy.com, Wal-mart, Target and so on. In this chapter, we consider the case where
there is one manufacturer and R retailers in the supply chain, facing price-sensitive
market demand.
Some attention has been paid by previous researchers to the one-manufacturer multiple-
retailer case, but most of them assume a deterministic and exogenous market demand.
Lal and Staelin (1984) develop a quantity discount schedule for a manufacturer sup-
plying multiple homogeneous retailers. However, they assume that the manufacturer’s
production policy is not affected by changes in the retailer’s order quantities. Joglekar
(1988) points out that the order sizes of the retailer affect not only the manufacturer’s
revenue, but also its manufacturing cost, which is ignored by Lal and Staelin (1984).
Since the decisions made by the manufacturer and the retailers affect each other’s prof-
its, it is important to study how the manufacturer and retailers can work in a cooperative
manner to maximize the entire supply chain’s profit.
Zahir and Sarker (1991) examine the single manufacturer and multiple retailers
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case under price dependent demands. They assume that the market demands from
retailers are functions of their respective retail prices, then they obtain optimum EOQs
for the retailers. They also study how the manufacturer can minimize the production
cost by compensating the retailers and encouraging them to order quantities different
from their EOQs. Although this paper is meaningful from the standpoint of pricing and
inventory management practice, it has two shortcomings. First, it does not incorporate
the multiple lot shipment policy, i.e, each production lot is delivered in one shipment;
secondly, it does not maximize the profit of the entire supply chain, but just find a way
for the manufacturer to minimize its cost based on the possible reaction of the retailers.
Hence the manufacturer and the retailers do not work in a cooperative manner.
To overcome the limitations of Zahir and Sarker (1991)’s work, Siajadi, Ibrahim and
Lochert (2006) propose a single manufacturer and multiple retailers model to minimize
the joint total relevant cost (JTRC) for the manufacturer and the retailers. They propose
an exact solution for the two-retailer case, as well as an approximate solution for the
case of more than two retailers. However, they assume that the product’s demand is
known and is deterministic. Hoque (2011) further improves this model by incorporating
some realistic factors, including limited capacities of transport vehicles and buyer’s
storage space, significant setup and transportation times, limited lead times and batch
sizes. They propose a common optimal solution technique to their models.
Some researchers also examined the single-manufacturer multiple-retailer case from
other perspectives. For example, Lu (1995) proposes that it may be difficult for the
manufacturer to have information about the retailers’ holding and ordering costs. He
considers a situation where the objective is to minimize the manufacturer’s annual total
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cost, subject to maximum costs which the retailers are prepared to incur. In order to
use this model, the manufacturer only needs to know retailers’ annual demands and
previous order frequencies. Lu (1995) then proposes a heuristic procedure to obtain an
approximate solution for his model. Based on Lu’s model, Yao and Chiou (2004) argue
that the optimal cost curve of this model is piece-wise convex. Based on this finding,
they propose a search algorithm which is claimed to be more efficient than other heuris-
tics and yields the global optimal solutions for the 20 experimental problems used in
their paper.
Research on the single-manufacturer multiple-retailer case has been extended in
several directions. One of the important extensions involves a three stage supply chain
consisting of a single raw material supplier, single or multiple manufacturers, and mul-
tiple retailers. Kim, Hong, and Chang (2006) propose an interesting model with a
supplier, a manufacturer and multiple retailers, where the retailers may request differ-
ent types of items. They propose a heuristic procedure to find the production sequence
of multiple items, the common production cycle length, and the delivery frequencies
and quantities to minimize the average total cost. Nikandish, Eshghi and Torabi (2009)
extend the model with a single supplier and multiple manufacturers, each supplying
multiple retailers. They propose an analytical solution procedure, as well as an efficient
heuristic solution method.
Another important extension is to relax the assumption of deterministic demand
and examine the model in a stochastic environment. For example, Banerjee and Baner-
jee (1994) develop an analytical model based on a common cycle time approach, for
a single product, single-manufacturer, multiple-retailer supply chain under stochastic
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conditions. They present an iterative algorithm for determining the operating parame-
ters, and show that it can be beneficial to all parties in the supply chain to implement
their model.
In this chapter, our aim is to improve existing models concerning the single-manufacturer
multiple-retailer case by incorporating the pricing decisions (or determining market de-
mand by adjusting the retail price). In this case, market demand is unknown but depends
on the retail price. It is not uncommon in practice that an item is produced by a man-
ufacturer and sold in the market by several retailers. Any individual retailer does not
have enough market power to significantly affect or determine the market price of this
item. In this case, an equilibrium market price will be reached depending on the total
quantity of this item in the market. We investigate how the manufacturer and the retail-
ers can work in a cooperative manner to maximize supply chain profit by determining
the production sequence, delivery lot sizes and frequencies, as well as the retail price
of the product.
The assumptions and notation used in this chapter are presented in the next section.
In section 4.2, we derive an analytical model for a centralized supply chain, and propose
a solution method for this model. In section 4.3, we discuss the equilibrium retail
price in a decentralized supply chain and corresponding maximization problems for the
retailers and the manufacturer. We then illustrate our solution procedure through some
numerical examples in section 4.4, followed by a discussion of our findings.
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4.1 Assumptions
On the basis of existing work in this area (e.g. Banerjee & Banerjee, 1994; Siajadi,
Ibrahim, & Lochert, 2006; Kim, Hong, & Chang, 2006; Nikandish, Eshghi, & Torabi,
2009), we assume that the manufacturer coordinates the deliveries to the retailers by
employing a common cycle approach. There is a common inventory replenishment
cycle time, T , for the manufacturer and all the retailers. In each cycle, the manufacturer
has one production setup, and sends ni equal size shipments of the item to retailer i.
Note that the shipment sizes may differ for the retailers in accordance with their relevant
individual cost parameters and market shares.
We further assume that production is organized in such a way that the first shipment
for all retailers is made at the same time. There are two reasons to organize production
in this manner. First, this ensures that the item enters the market via all the retailers
at the same time, and none of the retailers will have an advantage by stepping into the
market earlier than the others. Secondly, the production sequence proposed by previous
researchers may have infeasible schedules. Our model guarantees that the schedule is
feasible by organizing it in this way.
We use subscript i to denote the parameters pertaining to retailer i. Consistent
with the last chapter and most of the existing literature, we assume an infinite planning
horizon, a single product and no shortages in our model. We also assume that, in the
centralized supply chain, the market will reach a unique equilibrium price pr, such that,
all the retailers will have the same retail price. Furthermore, each retailer i has a known
and fixed market share αi of this item. Thus, Di = αi · D and
∑R
i=1 αi = 1. The
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total market demand is confined to no more than P and is dependent on the retail price
defined by a linear function, D = a− b · pr.
4.2 Centralized Supply Chain
To understand clearly the implication of the inventory levels at the various stocking
points of a single-manufacturer multiple-retail supply chain, Figure 4-1 shows for il-
lustrative purposes, these inventory levels against time for three retailers and a manu-
facturer.
We first examine the inventory holding costs for the manufacturer and the retailers.
The average inventory level for retailer i is
Ir,i =
qi
2
=
T
2
Di
ni
=
αi
2
TD
ni
. (4.1)
Next, we focus on the average inventory level for the whole supply chain. The minimum
inventory level for the entire supply chain occurs when the manufacturer starts the
production process. At this time, the inventory held by the retailers, which will be
replenished by the first set of deliveries, can be expressed as
Is,min = D ·
R∑
i=1
qi
P
=
T ·D2
P
R∑
i=1
αi
ni
.
where
∑R
i=1
qi
P
is the time needed by the manufacturer to produce the necessary quantity
of the item for delivering the first shipment to all the retailers. The minimum inventory
level can be seen as the “safety stock” for the system to ensure the feasibility of the
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Figure 4.1: Inventory pattern of a supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and 3
retailers
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replenishment schedule.
The maximum inventory level for the entire supply chain is the minimum level
plus the inventory built up during the production cycle. The rate of increase is the
difference between the production rate and the overall market demand rate, P − D,
and the production time is the production lot size divided by the production rate, i.e.
DT/P .
Thus, the maximum inventory level can be written as
Is,max = Is,min +
D
P
· T · (P −D)
=
T ·D2
P
(
1−
R∑
i=1
αi
ni
)
+
D
P
· T.
Consequently, the average inventory level of the entire supply chain is
Is = Is,min +
1
2
(Is,max − Is,min)
=
T ·D2
P
R∑
i=1
αi
ni
+
D
2P
· T · (P −D) . (4.2)
The average inventory level of manufacturer is
Im = Is −
R∑
i=1
Ir,i
=
T ·D2
P
R∑
i=1
αi
ni
+
D
2P
· T · (P −D)−
R∑
i=1
(
αi
2
TD
ni
)
. (4.3)
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4.2.1 Model Formulation
The inventory holding cost for the entire supply chain system is
Hm · Is +
R∑
i=1
(Hr,i −Hm) · Ir,i
= Hm ·
[
D2
P
· T ·
R∑
i=1
αi
ni
+
D
2P
· T · (P −D)
]
+
R∑
i=1
[
(Hr.i −Hm) · αi
2
· T ·D
ni
]
.
The sum of the production setup, the buyers’ ordering and the fixed shipment costs per
year can be written as
S +
∑R
i=1 [ni ·Oi]
T
.
The transportation cost per year consists of the fixed costs and associated variable costs:
∑R
i=1 [ni · Fi]
T
+D
R∑
i=1
(Vi · αi) .
Therefore, the profit for the entire supply chain can be expressed as
pis = D · (pr − C)−D ·
R∑
i=1
(Vi · αi)− S +
∑R
i=1 [ni · (Oi + Fi)]
T
−
{
Hm ·
[
D2
P
· T ·
R∑
i=1
αi
ni
+
D
2P
· T · (P −D)
]
+
R∑
i=1
[
(Hr.i −Hm) · αi
2
· T ·D
ni
]}
.
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In summary, we have following optimization model
Max
D,T,ni
pis = D ·
(
a−D
b
− C
)
−D ·
R∑
i=1
(Vi · αi)− S +
∑R
i=1 [ni · (Oi + Fi)]
T
−
{
Hm ·
[
D2
P
· T ·
R∑
i=1
αi
ni
+
D
2P
· T · (P −D)
]
+
R∑
i=1
[
(Hr.i −Hm) · αi
2
· T ·D
ni
]}
s.t. D, T > 0
D < P
ni ∈ {1, 2, 3, ...} for i = 1, 2, ..., R. (4.4)
To solve this problem, we first relax the requirements of ni to be positive integers.
These will be considered later. For any given D, T and ni must satisfy the first order
optimality conditions as shown below.
∂pis
∂T
=
1
T 2
{
S +
R∑
i=1
[ni · (Oi + Fi)]
}
−
{
Hm ·
[
D2
P
·
∑ αi
ni
+
D
2P
· (P −D)
]
+
R∑
i=1
[
(Hr.i −Hm) · αi
2
· D
ni
]}
= 0. (4.5)
∂pis
∂ni
= −(Oi + Fi)
T
+Hm
[
D2
P
· T · αi
n2i
]
+ (Hr,i −Hm) · αi
2
T ·D
n2i
= 0. (4.6)
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From these, we can derive the optimal T and ni values as follows:
T =
√
2 · S · P
Hm ·D · (P −D) (4.7)
ni = T ·
√√√√[Hm · DP + Hr,i−Hm2 ] ·D · αi
(Oi + Fi)
. (4.8)
Substituting (4.7), (4.8) andD = a−b·pr into the objective function, we convert the
original optimization model (4.4) to a single variable maximization problem involving
pr, i.e.
Max
pr
pis = (a− b · pr)
[
pr − C −
R∑
i=1
(Viαi)
]
− 2
√
Hm · (a− b · pr) · (P − a+ b · pr) · S
2P
− 2
R∑
i=1
√[
Hm · (a− b · pr)
P
+
Hr,i −Hm
2
]
· (a− b · pr) · αi · (Oi + Fi). (4.9)
For simplicity, we define the following parameter:
δ¯ =
a
b
− C −
R∑
i=1
αiVi − 2
R∑
i=1
√
αi(Oi + Fi) ·Hm
P
.
With this parameter, our analysis (shown in Appendix 3) leads to the propositions be-
low. All the propositions of the single-manufacturer single-retailer centralized supply
chain as outlined in Chapter 3 can be extended to single-manufacturer multiple-retail
centralized supply chain by replacing δ with δ¯.
Proposition 5. The product is not profitable if δ¯ ≤ P
b
(1− η3) . If this condition holds,
the entire supply chain cannot achieve a positive profit.
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As discussed in chapter 3, δ¯ reflects the product’s profitability. Proposition 5 shows
that, when the product profitability is lower than or equal to a certain level, the best
strategy for the manufacturer and the retailer is to not deal with this product. In contrast,
if the product profitability is very high, the manufacturer and the retailer should be
willing to provide as much of the product as possible to the market to increase their
respective profits. This characteristic is shown and described in following proposition.
Proposition 6. If δ¯ ≥ P
b
(1 + η3), the profit of the entire supply chain is maximized by
choosing pr = a−Pb . That is, the manufacturer will keep producing the product contin-
uously without any interruptions. In this case, optimal ni 7→ ∞and qi =
√
2P ·(Oi+Fi)
Hr,i+Hm
.
The corresponding supply chain profit under this condition is given by
pis = P ·
(
a− P
b
− C −
R∑
i=1
αiVi
)
−
R∑
i=1
αi
√
2(Oi + Fi) · P · (Hm +Hr,i). (4.10)
When the product profitability δ¯ is neither as low as the condition stated in Proposition
5, and not as high as the condition stated in Proposition 6, the manufacturer and the
retailer have to determine the retail price in order to maximize the profit of the entire
supply chain. In this situation, we state following proposition.
Proposition 7. If P
b
≤ δ¯ < P
b
(1 + η3), the objective function is strictly concave in(
a
b
− P ·(1+η)
2b
, a
b
− P
2b
]
; If P
b
(1− η3) < δ¯ ≤ P
b
, the objective function is strictly concave
in
[
a
b
− P
2b
, a
b
− P ·(1−η)
2b
)
. In these situations, the maximization problem has a unique
inner local maximum solution, p¯r. Specifically,
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
a
b
− P
2b
< p¯r <
a
b
− P
2b
(1− η) if P
b
(1− η3) < δ¯ < P
b
p¯r =
a
b
− P
2b
if δ¯ = P
b
a
b
− P
2b
> p¯r >
a
b
− P
2b
(1 + η) if P
b
(1 + η3) > δ¯ > P
b
.
Based on above propositions, a binary-search algorithm is developed in section
4.2.2 to search for the optimal retail price. Once the optimal retail price is determined,
the objective function is concave in the number of shipments ni,∀i, and T . Thus, the
corresponding optimal T is determined by equation (4.7); and the optimal ni is an
integer around nˆi in equation (4.8), either bnˆic or dnˆie.
4.2.2 Solution Algorithm
The single-manufacturer single-retailer model can thus be seen as a special case of
single-manufacturer multiple-retailer model. Following the same line of reasoning as in
the last chapter, we propose the following algorithm to solve this optimization problem.
We first calculate δ¯ and η. Based on the calculated δ¯ and η, we apply corresponding
propositions. If δ¯ ≥ P
b
(1 + η3) or δ¯ ≤ P
b
(1− η3), an optimal solution can be deter-
mined immediately. Otherwise, based on Proposition 7, a binary search method is used
to find the optimal retail price within the corresponding interval. The following steps
are used in this algorithm:
Step 1. Calculate δ¯ and η. If δ¯ ≥ P
b
(1 + η3), then p∗r =
a−P
b
, n∗i 7→ ∞, q∗i =√
2P ·(Oi+Fi)
Hr,i+Hm
; If δ¯ ≤ P
b
(1− η3), then stop; If δ¯ = P
b
, then p¯r =
a−P/2
b
and go to step 4;
If P
b
(1− η3) < δ¯ < P
b
, then go to step 2; otherwise, go to step 3;
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Step 2. Perform a binary search over the interval
[
a
b
− P
2b
, a
b
− P ·(1−η)
2b
)
to search
for a p¯r such that 2p¯r −
√
S ·Hm (P−2D¯)√
2D¯·P(P−D¯)
= 2a
b
− δ¯, where D¯ = a − b · p¯r; go to
step 4;
Step 3. Perform a binary search over the interval
(
a
b
− P ·(1+η)
2b
, a
b
− P
2b
]
to search
for a p¯r such that 2p¯r −
√
S ·Hm (P−2D¯)√
2D¯·P(P−D¯)
= 2a
b
− δ¯, where D¯ = a − b · p¯r; go to
step 4;
Step 4. Calculate D¯ = a−b·p¯r, T¯ =
√
2·S·P
Hm·D¯·(P−D¯) , ni = T¯ ·
√[
Hm·DP +
Hr,i−Hm
2
]
·D·αi
(Oi+Fi)
;
using equation (4.9), if pis
(
p¯r, bn˜ic , T¯
) ≥ pis (p¯r, dn˜ie , T¯) (comparing all possible
combinations), then n¯ = bn˜c, otherwise, n¯i = dn˜ie; calculate corresponding pis =
pis
(
p¯r, n¯i, T¯
)
; go to step 5;
Step 5. If pis ≥ max {pis, 0}, then p∗r = p¯r, n∗i = n¯i, T ∗ = T¯ ; if pis ≤ 0, then quit;
otherwise, p∗r =
a−P
b
, n∗i 7→ ∞, q∗i =
√
2P ·(Oi+Fi)
Hr,i+Hm
.
4.3 Decentralized Supply Chain
The decentralized multiple-retailer model is quite different from the decentralized single-
retailer model. Unlike a centralized supply chain, in a decentralized supply chain, the
retailers do not work in a cooperative manner, but compete with each other. Numerous
studies have been done to examine the competition among multiple retailers in a supply
chain. Most of the existing literature, nevertheless, does not incorporate the production
process of the manufacturer and its production capacity (e.g. Cachon, 2000). Since
the production decision and capacity are incorporated in this thesis, conclusions and
solution methods from the earlier studies cannot be applied.
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4.3.1 The Nash Equilibrium
The competition among the retailers will result in a Nash equilibrium retail price, pr.
According to the market clear condition, the total market demand D can be expressed
as D = a + b · pr =
∑R
i=1Di, where Di is the order quantity per year of retailer i.
Note that, for each retailer i, the decision variable is Di but not pr. In a decentralized
and competitive environment, a retailer i is not able to determine the retail price. The
retail price is the equilibrium value of the competition which satisfies the market clear
condition that the total demand is equal to the total supply from the retailers. Each
retailer i decide its order quantity and sells all of this quantity in the market, which is
denoted by Di (i.e., this is a Cournot game; the retailers compete on the amount of the
product they order from the manufacturer) .
As discussed in chapter 3, the wholesale price, pw, will affect the profit shares of
the members of the supply chain. The manufacturer would prefer a higher pw, whereas
the retailers prefer it to be as low as possible. The manufacturer and the retailers may
negotiate with each other to determine the wholesale price, pw, to decide their individual
profit levels. Once pw is established, each retailer i has to decide the order quantity per
year Di and its economic order size qi; and the manufacturer needs to determine its
production lot size Q =
∑R
i=1 (ni · qi). Note that, each qi is decided by retailer i.
Thus, essentially, the manufacturer decides the number of shipments to each retailer in
a production cycle.
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The retailer i faces the following maximization problem
Max
qi, Di
Di ·
(
a−∑Rj=1Dj
b
− pw − Vi
)
− (Oi + Fi) ·Di
qi
− Hr,i · qi
2
s.t. Di < P −
∑
j 6=i
Dj
Di > 0
qi > 0. (4.11)
Thus, the optimal qi for any given Di can be written as
qi =
√
2 (Oi + Fi) ·Di
Hr,i
. (4.12)
Based on equation 4.12, maximization problem 4.11 is equivalent to
Max
Di
pidr,i (Di) = Di ·
(
a−∑Rj=1Dj
b
− pw − Vi
)
−
√
2Hr,i · (Oi + Fi) ·Di
s.t. Di < P −
∑
j 6=i
Dj
Di > 0. (4.13)
The best response of retailer i to the other retailers’ decisions is determined by
the first order optimality condition. The Nash equilibrium is the solution to the best
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response of all retailers. Therefore, at the Nash equilibrium,

(
a−∑Rj=1 Dj
b
− pw − v
)
− 2Di
b
−
√
Hr,i·(Oi+Fi)
2Di
= 0 for i = 1, 2, ..., R
Di > 0 for i = 1, 2, ..., R∑R
j=1 Dj < P
4.3.2 Manufacturer’s Maximization Problem
The manufacturer will then make its decision on the production lot size Q, as well as
the shipment schedule nis, in order to maximize its profit. The inventory level of the
manufacturer can be expressed as
1
2
[
R∑
j=1
[(
2− nj
P
)
Dj − 1
]
· qj +Q
]
.
which is derived following the same line of reasoning in SMSR supply chains. Hence,
the maximization problem for the manufacturer can be expressed as follows.
Max
Q,n1,n2,...,nR
pidm =
(
R∑
j=1
Dj
)
·
(
pw − c− S
Q
)
− Hm
2
[
R∑
j=1
[(
2− nj
P
)
Dj − 1
]
· qj +Q
]
s.t. nj ∈ {1, 2, ...}
Q =
R∑
i=1
njqj. (4.14)
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4.4 Numerical Example
In this section, we use a numerical example to illustrate the proposed algorithm for the
centralized supply chain, as well as the solution for the decentralized supply chain. A
type of shoes is produced by a shoe factory and distributed to two retailers for sale.
The relevant supply chain parameters are given as follows: C=$10/pair; S=$800/setup;
O1=$50/order; F1=$100/shipment; V1=$1/pair;O2=$45/order; F1=$95/shipment; V1=$0.9/pair;
Hm=$10 per pair per year; Hr,1=$11 per pair per year; Hr,2=$10.5 per pair per year;
P=20,000 pairs per year; a=20,000; b=800; α1 = 0.6; α2=0.4.
4.4.1 Centralized Supply Chain
We first examine the case where the shoe factory and the two retailers decide to co-
operate with each other to maximize the supply chain profits, i.e. the supply chain is
centralized. The supply chain parameters are computed as
δ¯ =
a
b
− C −
R∑
i=1
αiVi − 2
R∑
i=1
√
αi(Oi + Fi) ·Hm
P
= 13.281
η =
√
1− 2
P
(
b2 · S ·Hm
4
)1/3
=
√
1− 2
20, 000
(
8002 · 800 · 10
4
)1/3
= 0.9442.
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Thus, P
b
(1− η3) < δ¯ < P
b
. According to the algorithm outlined in section 4.2.2, we
have following results (the MATLAB code is provided in Appendix 2-2):
n1∗ = 1
n2∗ = 2
T∗ = 0.2048 year
pr∗ = $18.58 per pair
Our procedure requires only 5 iterations to yield the optimal solution, which is ex-
tremely efficient. The annual demand is 5132 pairs of shoes per year. The maximum
profit for the entire supply chain is about $27020 per year.
Compared with the numerical example in the previous chapter, this example has an
additional retailer. These two examples illustrate that adding one more retailer actually
reduces the profit level of the entire supply chain from $28033 per year to $27020 per
year, even though the added retailer (i.e., retailer 2 in this example) has more favorable
cost parameters than the existing retailer (i.e., retailer 1 in this example). One of the
reasons for this is that distributing a product via multiple retailers requires the manufac-
turer to coordinate the replenishment schedules of the retailers. This may force some
retailers to give up their own individually optimal positions. Another reason is that the
transportation cost may be higher for multiple retailers. Products are sent separately
to several retailers, thus such separate shipments cannot share the fixed transportation
cost. In practice, marketing managers usually believe that it is desirable to incorporate
more efficient retailers in the supply chain. Our examples, however, show that, if the
supply chain is centralized, this is not necessarily true.
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4.4.2 Decentralized Supply Chain
If the manufacturer and retailers do not cooperate with each other, then the profits in
the decentralized supply chain are illustrated in following figure.
Figure 4.2: Profits in the SMMR decentralized supply chain
As expected, the centralized supply chain yields a higher profit for the entire supply
chain than the decentralized case. In a decentralized supply chain, the profit of the
entire supply chain decreases with increasing wholesale price. Consequently, when
the retailer is the more powerful party and is able to seek a lower wholesale price,
the performance of the entire supply chain improves. The equilibrium retail prices are
illustrated in Table 2 below.
Table 2: Equilibrium retail price in the SMMR decentralized supply chain
pw 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
pr 19.27 19.78 20.3 20.82 21.24 21.87 22.41 22.96 23.56
Again, consistent with our expectation, the decentralized retail prices are higher
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than the centralized retail price. As in the single manufacturer single retailer case, the
centralization of the supply chain benefit the consumers in the form of a lower retail
price.
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5 Stochastic Models
Most of existing literature assumes that the market demand of the item in question is
deterministic. In inventory management practice, however, market demand usually is
stochastic and cannot be predicted with certainty. To study the joint pricing, production
and inventory decisions in this situation, we develop a stochastic model under a periodic
review policy in this chapter.
Banerjee & Banerjee (1994) is one of the few papers which examines the JELP
problem in a stochastic environment. They develop an analytical model for coordi-
nated inventory control between a supplier and multiple buyers. In their model, all
the shortages at the buyers and the supplier ends are fully backordered. During each
production cycle, the manufacturer produces a production lot based on a produce up-to
level of Sm (the amount of product for a new cycle after fulfilling the backorders from
the last cycle, if any) and send n shipments to each retailer i with lead time of li. The
shipment size to retailer i is the difference between a replenish-up-to level Si and its
actual inventory level when the shipment is sent. Banerjee and Banerjee propose an it-
erative solution algorithm to determine the production cycle length, shipment schedule
n, the produce-up-to level Sm and the replenish-up-to level Si for each retailer. Al-
though due to potential analytical complexities, their solution is approximate and does
not guarantee optimality, the numerical examples presented in their paper illustrate the
efficiency of their solution algorithm.
Following Banerjee and Banerjee (1994)’s analysis, we develop an analytical model
to determine the retail price pr, production cycle length T , shipment schedule n, and the
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(Sm, Sr) policy to maximize the profit of the entire supply chain. To facilitate the model
formulation process, we develop a single-manufacturer single-retailer model under an
infinite planning horizon. Since incorporating deterministic delivery lead times does
not affect the results of our model, for simplicity, we assume that all delivery lead times
are zero. We present a model below which may serve as a building block of further
extensions in this area of research.
Our model has three important differences from that developed by Banerjee and
Banerjee (1994). First, the retail price is not exogenous but a decision variable. market
demand is assumed to be stochastic, stationary and dependent on the retail price. Thus,
the objective is not to minimize the total relevant costs for the entire supply chain any
longer, but to maximize the expected profit of the entire supply chain. Secondly, we use
a different cost structure from that adopted by Banerjee and Banerjee (1994)’s model
in terms of backorder, ordering and transportation costs. In their paper, Banerjee and
Banerjee (1994) assume the backorder cost to be fixed for any stockout incident. We
assume that the backorder cost is related to the amount of backordered products. In
particular, we describe the backorder cost for the retailer as Br dollars per backordered
unit; whereas the backorder cost for the manufacturer is Bm dollars per backordered
unit. Moreover, we incorporate retailer ordering and transportation costs in our model.
In particular, the transportation cost consists of a fixed cost per shipment and a variable
cost per unit shipped. While these costs are ignored in Banerjee and Banerjee (1994)’s
model.
The assumptions and notation used in this chapter are presented in the next section.
In section 5.2, we derive an analytical model followed by a proposed solution method in
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section 5.3. We then illustrate our solution method through some numerical examples
in section 5.4, and section 5.5 presents a discussion of our findings.
5.1 Assumptions
Following Banerjee and Banerjee (1994), we make the following major assumptions:
(1) All shortages are backordered. The backorder cost is based on the concept of a
fixed cost per unit of shortage, i.e. the total backorder cost is linear in the number of
backorders.
(2) Delivery lead times are zero or negligibly small.
(3) “Backorder costs are sufficiently high, such that the average shortage quanti-
ties are negligibly small compared to average inventory balance for each party” (an
assumption in Banerjee and Banerjee (1994)’s model).
(4) The total annual demand D = D¯ ·  = (a − b · pr) · ; where  is a random
variable with expected value of 1 and standard deviation of σ. g() and G() are the
probability density function and the cumulative density function of  respectively.
Assumption (1) is widely used in the literature to represent the relationship between
backorder cost and number of backorders. We use a linear backorder cost in this thesis,
thus the backorder cost is independent of the time of shortage. Our analysis could be
easily extended to incorporate backorder cost which depends on both the amount of
backordered and the duration of shortage.
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Assumptions (2) and (3) are used for presentation and analysis simplicity only. In-
cluding lead time in our model does not make any differences in the qualitative results
and the model properties. Assuming a small shortage facilitates the derivation of ex-
pected inventory cost in the stochastic model. In practice, especially in the competitive
environment, companies usually do their best to improve consumer satisfaction and try
to fulfill all consumers’ demand in time. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the
unit backorder cost is high and the shortage amount is small.
Assumption (4) indicates that we are using a multiplicative stochastic term in this
thesis. The two most widely methods used in existing literature to model stochastic
demand are the multiplicative (e.g., Cachon & Kok, 2004; Petruzzi & Dada,1999; Song,
Ray & Boyaci, 2006) and the additive forms (e.g., Polatoglu & Sahin, 2000; Chen &
Simchi-Levi, 2004a). The multiplicative form assumes that the customer demand is the
product of a price-sensitive deterministic component and a non-price-sensitive random
variable; whereas the additive form assumes that the customer demand is the sum of
these two terms.
An important difference between the additive and the multiplicative forms is the
manner in which the random variable affects demand. In the additive demand case, the
variance of demand is independent of price, and the coefficient of variation of demand
is an increasing function of price. In the multiplicative demand case, the variance of
demand is a decreasing function of price, and its coefficient of variation is independent
of price. It appears that, it may be important to consider which form is more realistic.
Nevertheless, Aiginger (1987) considers this problem and concludes that there is no
rational economic basis for choosing between these two forms.
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We believe that it may be more reasonable to use the multiplicative form in this
thesis. This form is not only widely used but also is supported by empirical evidence
(Cachon and Kok 2004, Petruzzi and Dada 1999, Tellis 1988, and references therein).
In our setting, the deterministic part of the demand is unknown and variable. Demand
may vary significantly depending on the retail price. The additive form assumes that
the stochastic demand consists of a price-sensitive deterministic part and a non-price-
sensitive stochastic shock. If the magnitude of customer demand is unknown, it is not
easy to define an appropriate demand shock under the additive assumption. In addition,
it is unlikely that the variance of demand is independent of the retail price (as assumed
by the additive form). For example, it is not reasonable to assume that two markets,
with expected demands of 1,000 and 10,000 units respectively, have the same demand
variance. The multiplicative form does not have these problems and is, thus, more
suitable for the setting adopted in this thesis.
5.2 SMSR Stochastic Model
In this section, we develop the model formulation for a supply chain with single manu-
facturer and single retailer. We use the subscript r to denote the parameters pertaining
to a retailer. To formulate the model, we have to examine the revenues and costs associ-
ated in the supply chain. We first examine the inventory pattern to derive the inventory
cost. Figure 5-1 shows the inventory-time plots for a supply chain consisting of a single
manufacturer and a single retailer.
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Figure 5.1: Inventory pattern of a supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a
retailer in a stochastic demand environment
Following Banerjee and Banerjee (1994), the average inventory level of the retailer
can be expressed as one half of its expected demand each replenishment cycle (a− b ·
pr) · T/n plus the safety stock, which is the difference of Sr and the expected demand
during each replenishment cycle D · T/n. Hence, the average inventory level of the
retailer is
Ir =
D¯ · T/n
2
+
[
Sr − ¯D · T/n
]
= Sr − D¯ · T
2n
. (5.1)
Following the same line of reasoning, the average inventory level of the manufacturer
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can be expressed as its average active inventory plus its safety stock. The average
active inventory can be written as (see Chapter 3 of this thesis or Banerjee (1986) for
derivation)
D¯ · T
2n
·
{
D¯
P
(2− n) + n− 1
}
.
The safety stock of the manufacturer is given by the difference of the produce-up-to
level Sm and the expected market demand during the production cycle T . That is, it can
be described as Sm − D¯ · T . Thus, the average inventory level of the manufacturer is
Im =
D¯ · T
2n
{
D¯
P
(2− n) + n− 1
}
+ Sm − D¯ · T. (5.2)
We then examine the backorder costs for the manufacturer and the retailer respec-
tively. Note that during each cycle, the demand is D · T , while the quantity of products
available for the cycle is Sm. So, at the manufacturer end, the expected total backorder
quantity during time interval T is
ˆ ∞
Sm
D¯·T
(
D¯ · T · x− Sm
) · g (x) dx.
At the retailer’s end, the demand during each replenishment cycle isD ·T/n. While the
quantity of products available for this time interval is Sr. So, the expected backorder
quantity during the time interval T/n is
ˆ ∞
Sr
D¯T/n
(
D¯ · T
n
· x− Sr
)
g (x) dx.
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The expected total profit is the expected revenue minus the expected total cost, in-
cluding production cost, inventory cost, backorder cost, transportation cost and ordering
cost. Therefore, the expected total profit for the entire supply chain can be expressed as
pis = D¯ · (pr − C)−
[
n ·O + S
T
]
−
[
n · F
T
+ D¯ · V
]
− Bm · 1
T
ˆ ∞
Sm
D¯·T
(
D¯ · T · x− Sm
) · g (x) dx
− Br · n
T
ˆ ∞
Sr
D¯T/n
(
D¯ · T
n
· x− Sr
)
g (x) dx
− Hm
{
D¯ · T
2n
[
D¯
P
(2− n)− n− 1
]
+ Sm
}
− Hr
{
Sr − D¯ · T
2n
}
. (5.3)
where the first term represents the revenue less the production cost; the second term is
the sum of setup and ordering costs; the third term is the transportation cost; the fourth
term is the backorder cost; and the last two term are the holding costs for manufacturer
and the retailer, respectively. Therefore, the maximization problem can be formulated
as maximizing pis via manipulating the five decision variables n, T, pr, Sr, Sm.
It is mathematically intractable to examine the optimality conditions of these five
decision variables simultaneously. To solve the maximization problem, we first exam-
ine the optimality conditions of Sr and Sm for given D¯, T and n. Based on the analysis
in Appendix 5, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 8. For any given D¯, T and n, the objective function is jointly concave in
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Sr and Sm. The Sr and Sm to maximize the objective function are given as follows:
Sm = D¯ · T ·G−1
(
1− Hm · T
Bm
)
(5.4)
Sr =
D¯ · T
n
·G−1
(
1− Hr · T
Br · n
)
(5.5)
Proposition 8 enables us to reduce the decision variables of the maximization prob-
lem to D¯, T and n only. Substituting equation (5.4) and equation (5.5) into the objective
function, we have the following equivalent objection function:
pis = D¯
(
a− D¯
b
− C − V
)
− n · (O + F ) + S
T
− D¯ · T
2n
{
Hm
[
D¯
P
(2− n)− n− 1
]
−Hr
}
− D¯ ·
{
Bm
(ˆ ∞
G−1(1−Hm·TBm )
x · g (x) dx
)
+Br
(ˆ ∞
G−1(1−Hr ·TBr ·n )
x · g (x) dx
)}
.
5.2.1 A Heuristic Algorithm
It is still mathematically intractable to derive the optimal values of D¯, T and n si-
multaneously. Therefore, we develop a heuristic algorithm by iteratively obtaining the
optimal expected demand level and the optimal cycle length as well as the optimal
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delivery frequencies. To do so, we define following notation:
ρm =
Sm
D¯ · T
ρr =
Sr
D¯ · T/n
Thus ρm and ρr represent the ratio of Sm, Sr and corresponding demands respectively.
Note that it is not meaningful to have Sm less than the expected demand in T ; similarly,
Sr is not less than the expected demand in T/n. Hence, both ρm and ρr are greater than
1. For notational simplicity, we further denote the expected backorder cost per unit as
L (ρm, ρr)
=
1
D¯ · T
{
Bm
ˆ ∞
Sm
D¯·T
(
D¯ · T · x− Sm
) · g (x) dx+Br · nˆ ∞
Sr
D¯·T/n
(
D¯ · T
n
· x− Sr
)
g (x) dx
}
= Bm ·
ˆ ∞
ρm
(x− ρm) · g (x) dx+Br ·
ˆ ∞
ρr
(x− ρr) g (x) dx.
Therefore, the expected backorder cost per unit is defined by ρm and ρr once D¯, T
and n are determined. In other words, once ρm and ρr are known, the expected back-
order cost per unit is determined. Thus, the only difference between the maximiza-
tion problem in this section and the deterministic model in chapter 3 is the determined
(fixed) backorder cost per unit. Hence, we are able to use algorithm SMSR in chapter
3 to solve the maximization problem. However, both ρm and ρr are unknown and vari-
able. A heuristic method to deal with this problem is to initialize ρm and ρr, and then
iteratively update ρm and ρr until they converge.
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Based on the above discussion, a detailed procedure of the proposed heuristic is
described below:
Step 1: Initialize ρm and ρr;
Step 2: Use algorithm SMSR in chapter 3 of this thesis to obtain D¯, T and n
maximizing pis;
Step 3: Update ρm as G−1
(
1− Hm·T
Bm
)
and ρr as G−1
(
1− Hr·T
Br·n
)
;
Step 4: Repeat step 2 until ρm and ρr converge.
5.2.2 Some Specific Distributions of 
The proposed algorithm above can be used for any distribution of the random variable
 when its probability density function and cumulative density function are known. For
a specific distribution, L (ρm, ρr) can be obtained via numerical analysis or mathemati-
cal transformation. Some specific distributions, especially normal distribution and uni-
form distribution, are frequently discussed in the literature. We discuss how to obtain
L (ρm, ρr) for some specific distributions of  in this section. Details of the derivation
in this section are presented in Appendix 5.
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Normal Distribution
When  is normally distributed, then
ˆ ∞
ρm
(x− ρm) · g (x) dx = σ2 · g (ρm)− (ρm − 1) [1−G (ρm)]
ˆ ∞
ρr
(x− ρr) · g (x) dx = σ2 · g (ρr)− (ρr − 1) [1−G (ρr)]
Thus
L (ρm, ρr) = Bm · T ·
ˆ ∞
ρm
(x− ρm) · g (x) dx+Br · T
n
·
ˆ ∞
ρr
(x− ρr) g (x) dx
= Bm ·
{
σ2 · g (ρm)− (ρm − 1) [1−G (ρm)]
}
+ Br ·
{
σ2 · g (ρr)− (ρr − 1) [1−G (ρr)]
}
.
Uniform Distribution
When  is uniformly distributed between 1−ψ and 1 +ψ where ψ ∈ (0, 1), then the
standard deviation is σ = ψ√
3
. And
ˆ ∞
ρm
(x− ρm) · g (x) dx = 1
4ψ
[1 + ψ − ρm]2
ˆ ∞
ρr
(x− ρr) · g (x) dx = 1
4ψ
[1 + ψ − ρr]2
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Thus
L (ρm, ρr) = Bm ·
ˆ ∞
ρm
(x− ρm) · g (x) dx+Br ·
ˆ ∞
ρr
(x− ρr) g (x) dx
=
1
4ψ
{
Bm [1 + ψ − ρm]2 +Br [1 + ψ − ρr]2
}
.
Gamma Distribution
When  is gamma-distributed with a scale parameter θ and a shape parameter ξ. Since
the expected value is 1, θ · ξ = 1. The standard deviation is σ = θ · √ξ. Then
ˆ ∞
ρm
(x− ρm) · g (x) dx = ρm · θ · g (ρm)− (ρm − 1) [1−G (ρm)]
ˆ ∞
ρr
(x− ρr) · g (x) dx = ρr · θ · g (ρr)− (ρr − 1) [1−G (ρr)] .
Thus
L (ρm, ρr) = Bm ·
ˆ ∞
ρm
(x− ρm) · g (x) dx+Br ·
ˆ ∞
ρr
(x− ρr) g (x) dx
= Bm · {ρm · θ · g (ρm)− (ρm − 1) [1−G (ρm)]}
+ Br · {ρr · θ · g (ρr)− (ρr − 1) [1−G (ρr)]} .
Chi-square Distribution
When  is a chi-square distribution with expected value of 1, the standard deviation
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is σ =
√
2. Then
ˆ ∞
ρm
(x− ρm) · g (x) dx = ρm · g (ρm)− (ρm − 1) [1−G (ρm)]
ˆ ∞
ρr
(x− ρr) · g (x) dx = ρr · g (ρr)− (ρr − 1) [1−G (ρr)]
Thus
L (ρm, ρr) = Bm ·
ˆ ∞
ρm
(x− ρm) · g (x) dx+Br ·
ˆ ∞
ρr
(x− ρr) g (x) dx
= Bm · {ρm · g (ρm)− (ρm − 1) [1−G (ρm)]}
+ Br · {ρr · g (ρr)− (ρr − 1) [1−G (ρr)]} .
5.3 SMMR Stochastic Model
The discussion in the previous section is based on a single manufacturer single retailer
supply chain. The model formulation can be extended to supply chains with multi-
ple retailers. In this section, we discuss the extension to the case involving a single
manufacturer and multiple retailers.
Following the discussion in chapter 4 of this thesis, we assume that the manufacturer
coordinates the deliveries to the retailers by employing a common cycle approach. We
further assume that production is organized in such a way that the first shipment for
all retailers is made at the same time. We use subscript i to denote the parameters
pertaining to retailer i. We also assume that the market will reach a unique equilibrium
price pr, such that, all the retailers will have the same retail price. Furthermore, each
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retailer i has a known and fixed market share αi of this item. Thus, Di = αi · D and∑R
i=1 αi = 1.
Following the same line of reasoning as in the previous section, we first derive the
inventory holding cost. The average inventory level of a retailer i can be expressed as
one half of its expected demand each replenishment cycle D¯i·T/ni plus the safety stock,
which is the difference of Sr,i and the expected demand during each replenishment cycle
D¯i · T/ni. Hence, the average inventory level of retailer i is
Ir,i =
D¯i · T/ni
2
+
[
Sr,i − ¯Di · T/ni
]
= Sr,i − D¯i · T
2ni
. (5.6)
Following the same line of reasoning, the average inventory level of the manufac-
turer can be expressed as its average active inventory plus its safety stock. According
to equation (4.3), the average active inventory can be written as
T · D¯2
P
R∑
i=1
αi
ni
+
D¯
2P
· T · (P − D¯)− R∑
i=1
(
αi
2
T ¯·D
ni
)
.
The safety stock of the manufacturer is given by the difference of the produce-up-to
level Sm and the expected market demand during the production cycle T . The safety
stock, therefore, can be described as Sm − D¯ · T . It follows that the average inventory
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level of the manufacturer is
Im =
T · D¯2
P
R∑
i=1
αi
ni
+
D¯
2P
· T · (P − D¯)− R∑
i=1
(
αi
2
T ¯·D
ni
)
+ Sm − D¯ · T
=
[
T · D¯
(
D¯
P
− 1
2
)] R∑
i=1
αi
ni
− D¯
2P
· T · (P +D) + Sm. (5.7)
We then examine the backorder costs for the manufacturer and the retailer respec-
tively. At the manufacturer’s end, the expected total backorder quantity during time
interval T is
ˆ ∞
Sm
D¯·T
(
D¯ · T · x− Sm
) · g (x) dx.
At the retailer’s end, the expected backorder quantity during the time interval T/n for
retailer i is
ˆ ∞
Sr,i
D¯iT/ni
(
D¯i · T
ni
· x− Sr,i
)
g (x) dx.
Therefore, incorporating the revenue, transportation cost, ordering cost, inventory
cost and inventory cost, the expected total profit for the entire supply chain can be
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expressed as
pis = D¯ · (pr − C)− D¯ ·
R∑
i=1
(Vi · αi)− S +
∑R
i=1 [ni · (Oi + Fi)]
T
− Bm · 1
T
ˆ ∞
Sm
D¯·T
(
D¯ · T · x− Sm
) · g (x) dx
−
R∑
i=1
[
Br,i · ni
T
ˆ ∞
Sr,i
D¯iT/ni
(
D¯i · T
ni
· x− Sr,i
)
g (x) dx
]
− Hm
{[
T · D¯
(
D¯
P
− 1
2
)] R∑
i=1
αi
ni
− D¯
2P
· T · (P +D) + Sm
}
−
R∑
i=1
[
Hr,i
(
Sr,i − D¯i · T
2ni
)]
. (5.8)
Consequently, the maximization problem is to maximize pis, expressed by (5.8), by
varying the decision variables ni, T, pr, Sr,i, Sm. As in the case of a single retailer, we
have the following propositions.
Proposition 9. For any given D¯, T and ni, the objective function is jointly concave
in Sr,i and Sm. The Sr,i and Sm that maximize the objective function are obtained as
follows:
Sm = D¯ · T ·G−1
(
1− Hm · T
Bm
)
(5.9)
Sr,i =
D¯i · T
ni
·G−1
(
1− Hr,i · T
Br,i · ni
)
. (5.10)
As in the last section, we develop a heuristic algorithm to obtain the optimal values
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of the decision variables. To do so, we adopt the following notation:
ρr,i
=
Sr,i
D¯i · T/ni
L˜ (ρm, ρr,i)
=
1
D¯ · T
{
Bm
ˆ ∞
Sm
D¯·T
(
D¯ · T · x− Sm
) · g (x) dx}
+
1
D¯ · T
{
R∑
i=1
[
Br,i · ni
ˆ ∞
Sr,i
D¯i·T/ni
(
D¯i · T
ni
· x− Sr,i
)
g (x) dx
]}
= Bm ·
ˆ ∞
ρm
(x− ρm) · g (x) dx+
R∑
i=1
[
Br,i ·
ˆ ∞
ρr,i
(x− ρr,i) g (x) dx
]
.
With the above notation, a detailed procedure of the proposed heuristic is described
below:
Step 1: Initialize ρm and ρr,i;
Step 2: Use algorithm SMMR in chapter 4 of this thesis to obtain D¯, T and ni
maximizing pis;
Step 3: Update ρm as G−1
(
1− Hm·T
Bm
)
and ρr,i as G−1
(
1− Hr,i·T
Br,i·ni
)
;
Step 4: Repeat step 2 until ρm and ρr,i converge.
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5.4 Numerical Example
We examine a supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer. The cost and
other parameters of the supply chain are the same as those of the numerical example
in chapter 3. The demand is not deterministic but has a uniform distribution around
its expected value with 20% variation (i.e. ψ=0.2). This means  has a uniform dis-
tribution over [0.8, 1.2]. The expected value is 1 and standard deviation σ is 0.2√
3
. The
backorder costs at the retailer’s and the manufacturer’s end are $5 per unit and $4 per
unit respectively. In this case,
L (ρm, ρr) =
1
4ψ
{
Bm [1 + ψ − ρm]2 +Br [1 + ψ − ρr]2
}
=
1
4× 0.2
{
5× [1 + 0.2− ρm]2 + 4× [1 + 0.2− ρr]2
}
= 6.25× [1.2− ρm]2 + 5× [1.2− ρr]2
Based on the proposed algorithm in section 5.2, we have following results:
ρm = 1.04
ρr = 1.09
T = 0.1966
n = 2
D = 5095
Thus, pr = 18.63, Sm = 1042, Sr = 546. The resulting total supply chain profit is
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$26956 per year, which is $1077 less than the total supply chain profit under determin-
istic demand. Thus, the $1077 additional cost occurs due to the stochastic environment.
In this example, ρm and ρr converge in only 2 iterations, showing the efficiency of the
proposed algorithm.
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6 Conclusion and Future Research Directions
This dissertation has conducted an extensive study of the optimal decisions that man-
agement can make to maximize the expected total profit of a two-echelon supply chain.
In particular, the focus is on how a manufacturer and a retailer in such a supply chain
can cooperate with each other to make their decisions on production, pricing and in-
ventory control in order to achieve the maximum realizable profit level for the entire
supply chain. To the best of our knowledge, this thesis is among the first to systemati-
cally address this issue .
We examine supply chains with different structures: (1) a single-manufacturer single-
retailer (SMSR) supply chain under deterministic demand, (2) a single-manufacturer
multiple-retailer (SMMR) supply chain under deterministic demand, and (3) supply
chains under stochastic demand. These three different structures are presented in chap-
ters 3, 4 and 5 of this thesis respectively. In chapter 5, supply chains under stochastic
demand, model formulation is developed for single-manufacturer single-retailer supply
chains and further extended to single-manufacturer multiple-retailers supply chains.
For each supply chain structure, we develop the appropriate mathematical model, out-
line important propositions on its optimal solution, and propose an algorithm to solve
the optimization problem accordingly. Our algorithms are illustrated through numerical
examples and shown to be very efficient.
Our research also contributes to the literature of supply chain integration. Existing
works in this area either focus on how supply chain members can make integrated de-
cisions on inventory control and pricing to maximize their individual profits, or on how
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the manufacturer and retailers can make integrated decisions on production and inven-
tory control for maximizing the profit of the entire supply chain. However, due to the
analytical difficulties, relatively little attention has been devoted to such integrated de-
cision making. This dissertation fills this gap in the literature, and provides the building
blocks for further research extensions.
6.1 Managerial Implications
Our research contributes to management practice by providing some practical impli-
cations of supply chain cooperation and integration. One objective of this thesis is to
develop some practical insights for making integrated decisions in supply chains. These
managerial implications are discussed below.
First, we outline the incentives for supply chain integration, and suggest that, in a
single-manufacturer single-retailer supply chain, such integration is always beneficial
to the manufacturer, the retailer and the consumer. By integrating supply chains si-
multaneously in the vertical and horizontal directions, we show how the organizations
can cooperate with each other in order to enhance the profitability of the entire supply
chain. We find that, in a single-retailer supply chain, cooperation between the manufac-
turer and the retailer yields greater consumer benefits via lowering of the retail price.
In addition, both the manufacturer and the retailer can improve their profits by sharing
the surplus.
Our analysis further provides some insights on the effect of the supply chain power
structure on the social benefit resulting from such integration. As discussed earlier in
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this thesis, when the retailer dominates the supply chain, the wholesale price is likely to
be relatively low and the decentralized retail price will be closer to a centralized retail
price. On the other hand, if the manufacturer is more powerful than the retailer, the
wholesale price will be relatively high and the decentralized retail price will be further
away from the centralized retail price. Note that the further the decentralized retail
price is away from the centralized retail price, the stronger the effect of centralization
on extra channel benefit and consumer benefit. Therefore, social benefit of supply chain
integration is more evident for supply chains dominated by the manufacturer.
In single-manufacturer multiple-retailer supply chains, it is always advantageous for
the manufacturer and the retailers to cooperate and integrate their efforts. It is shown by
our numerical analyses that incorporating more retailers is not necessarily desirable for
a supply chain even when the newly incorporated retailers are more profitable and cost
efficient than the existing ones in the supply chain. In practice, marketing managers
usually believe that it is beneficial to incorporate more efficient retailers in the supply
chain. Our computational experience indicates that, if the supply chain is centralized,
this is not necessarily true.
The results of our numerical examples also show that, in decentralized supply
chains, it is possible for the manufacturer to realize more profit by incorporating more
retailers in the supply chain. The extra profit gained, however, appears to be limited.
Intuitively speaking, on the one hand, increasing the number of retailers would make
competition among the retailers more intense, resulting in greater negotiation power
on the part of the manufacturer. From this perspective, the manufacturer is likely to
achieve higher profit. On the other hand, however, competition among the retailers
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may also limit the total profit of the supply chain, somewhat negating the profit gained
due to the previous phenomenon.
6.2 Future Research Directions
While this dissertation has made contributions in shedding light on many of the key
problems involving integrated decision making in supply chains, it is, by no means, an
exhaustive study. Much future research can be done based on the findings of this thesis.
We examine below some of the possible directions for further research.
6.2.1 Extension to multiple manufacturers
Our analysis in this thesis can be extended to supply chains with multiple manufactur-
ers. It is not unusual that some manufacturers produce same or perfectly substitutable
products. These manufacturers may distribute their product via a common retailer or
multiple retailers. To extend our analysis to supply chains with multiple-manufacturer
and single retailer, an important issue is how the retailer coordinates the production
related decisions of the manufacturers. It is quite possible that the total production ca-
pacity at the manufacturers’ end is much higher than the market demand. If this is the
case, the allocation of the market demand to the manufacturers has to be determined.
If the manufactures distribute their product via different retailers, then we may have
to consider the competition among different supply chains. For example, two man-
ufacturers A and B produce the some product and distribute it via retailer C and D
respectively. In this case, Manufacturer A and retailer C may consist of a supply chain,
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while manufacturer B and retailer D may consist of another. These two supply chains
might compete with each other in the market and thus result in quite different conclu-
sions from the settings in this thesis. An even more complex supply chain structure is
that the manufacturers distribute their product via multiple common retailers. Both of
these important issues discussed above warrant further study.
6.2.2 Extension to multiple products
We consider only a single product in this study. Our analysis should be extended to
multiple products. In managerial practice, a manufacturer usually produces more than
one product. For example, a shoe manufacturer might produce different kind of shoes,
such as running shoes, slippers, dress shoes and so on. To deal with the manufacturing,
distribution and sale of these products, some important issues have to be examined.
One important issue in supply chains with multiple products is whether these prod-
ucts use the same productive facilities. If so, then the scheduling problem become
important. In particular, we might assume two different settings. One is that all of
these products have the same production rate. This is a simple case, in which the man-
ufacturer has to determine how to allocate its production capacity to these products
toward maximizing the total profit of the supply chain. A more complex scenario oc-
curs when the manufacturer has different production rates for these products. In this
case, the manufacturer does not have fixed production capacity. Its production capacity
depends on product selection and volume decisions.
Another issue to be considered in the multiple-product setting is whether the prod-
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ucts share the same transportation facilities. For example, if the products can be shipped
via a common truck, then the total transportation cost of these products may be lower
than shipping them individually. This can affect the optimal shipping schedule of the
products. Sometimes, the products have to be shipped together. For example, a man-
ufacturer producing one kind of a printer and the corresponding ink cartridges usually
has to ship both the printer and cartridges to the retailer(s) at the same time. These
characteristics will result in a more complex problem deriving the shipping schedules.
Finally, we have to consider the potential substitution and complementarity of mul-
tiple products. It is quite common for a manufacturer to produce some substitutable
or complementary products. For example, a computer manufacturer, e.g. Dell, usu-
ally offers both desktop and laptop computers, which are sometimes substitutable. If
the products are substitutable or complementary to each other, then the price of one
product may affect the demands of the other products. Hence, the pricing of all these
products have to be considered simultaneously, which considerably complicates the
profit maximization problem.
6.2.3 Incorporating supply chain coordination
In this thesis, we discuss some of the major issues that result from the cooperation of
the manufacturer and the retailer(s) in a centralized supply chain. We also present the
bargaining problem between the manufacturer and the retailer(s) about how they can
share the extra benefits of centralization. However, due to many practical reasons, the
manufacturer and the retailer(s) sometimes are not able to reach an agreeable outcome.
In such a situation, some coordination mechanisms are needed to arrive at centralized
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decisions in decentralized supply chains.
Extensive research has been done to date on the supply chain channel coordination.
Various coordination mechanisms have been developed, such as quantity discount (e.g.
Gurnani, 2001; Qin, Tang & Guo, 2007), two-part tariff (e.g. Lal, 1990; Moorthy,
1987), returns policy (e.g. Hahn, Hwang & Shinn, 2004; Padmanabhan, 1995), and
revenue sharing (e.g. Cachon & Lariviere, 2005; Zhou & Yang, 2008). However, to
the best of our knowledge, no coordination mechanism has been developed so far for a
supply chain with price-dependent demand when inventory costs are considered.
It is a challenging prospect to develop coordination mechanisms for the supply
chain structures considered in this thesis. Most of the existing coordination mecha-
nisms alone are not able to coordinate such structures. For example, it has been shown
that, quantity discount alone cannot coordinate a supply chain when inventory costs are
considered (Weng, 1995a, 1995b; Viswanathan & Wang, 2003). It has also been shown
that a return policy by itself does not coordinate a supply chain under price dependent
demand (Emmons & Gilbert, 1998).
Therefore, more innovative coordination mechanisms may be necessary. Actually,
some non-traditional mechanisms have been developed in the relevant literature, which
provide important insights into the coordination of supply chain structures discussed in
this thesis. For example, Chen, Federgruen and Zheng (2001) develop a coordination
mechanism in a supply chain with one manufacturer and multiple retailers with con-
sideration of inventory cost and price-dependent demand. They find that coordination
is achieved via a combination of periodically charged, fixed fees, and a nontraditional
discount pricing scheme under which the discount given to a retailer is the sum of three
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discount components based on the retailer’s (i) annual sales volume, (ii) order quantity,
and (iii) order frequency, respectively.
However, Chen, Federgruen and Zheng (2001) do not consider the production pro-
cess and assume that the production rate is infinite. They also use a simple power-of-
two mechanism to coordinate the replenishment of the retailers. The single-manufacturer
multiple-retailer (SMMR) supply chain considered in this thesis is more complicated
than the one dealt with by Chen, Federgruen and Zheng (2001). Thus, the development
of more complex coordination mechanisms appears to be a desirable and necessary
direction for future research.
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Appendix 1: Notation
The notation used in this study are listed in alphabetical order:
C: production cost per unit
D: total market demand rate per year
Di: market demand rate per year on retailer i
F : fixed transportation cost per shipment
Fi: fixed transportation cost per shipment for retailer i
Hi: inventory holding cost per unit per year for retailer i
Hm: inventory holding cost per unit per year for the manufacturer
Hr: inventory holding cost per unit per year for the retailer
Im: average manufacturer inventory
Ir: average retailer inventory
Ir,i: average inventory level of retailer i
Is: average inventory for the entire supply chain
n: number of shipments per production cycle
ni: number of shipments per production cycle to retailer i
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O: retailer ordering cost
Oi: retailer i’s ordering cost
pr: retail price charged to the consumers
pw: wholesale price charged by the manufacturer to the retailer
P : production rate per year
q: delivery lot size
qi: delivery lot size to retailer i
Q: production lot size
R: the number of retailers
S: production setup cost
Sm: produce-up-to-level for a manufacturer
Sr: order-up-to-level for a retailer
T : production cycle length
TP : production time in a manufacturing cycle
V : total variable transportation cost per unit for each shipment
Vi: variable transportation cost per unit for each shipment for retailer i
pim: manufacturer profit per year
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pir: total retailer profit per year
pir,i: retailer i’s profit per year
pis: total profit of entire supply chain per year
111
Appendix 2: MATLAB Codes
A2.1 Code for SMSR Algorithm (section 3.2.2)
%% Parameters %%
C=10;
S=800;
O=50;
F=100;
v=1;
Hm=10;
Hr=11;
P=20000;
a=20000;
b=800;
%% Get results %%
[result1 result2 result3]=smsr(C,S,O,F,v,Hm,Hr,P,a,b)
%% Function smsr %%
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function [nstar,qstar,prstar]=smsr(C,S,O,F,v,Hm,Hr,P,a,b)
e=0.05;
var Dstar;
var prstar;
var nstar;
var qstar;
var pair;
var paim;
var pais;
var L;
var U;
var n;
result=zeros(100,5);
pw=15;
%% delta and eta %%
alpha=Hr/Hm-1;
delta=a/b-C-v-2*sqrt((O+F)*Hm/P);
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eta=sqrt(1-(2*b^2*S*Hm)^(1/3)/P);
%% cases %%
if delta<= P*(1-eta^3)/b disp(’Not profitable’);
elseif delta>=P*(1+eta^3)/b
Dstar=P;
elseif delta==P/b
Dstar=P/2;
elseif delta>P/b
L=P/2;
U=P*(1+eta)/2;
Dstar=(L+U)/2;
i=1;
while(abs(Y1(Dstar, delta, S, Hm, P)-Y2(Dstar,b))>e)
if Y1(Dstar, delta, S, Hm, P)>Y2(Dstar,b)
L=Dstar;
else
U=Dstar;
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end;
Dstar=(L+U)/2;
result(i,:)=[L, U, Dstar, Y1(Dstar, delta, S, Hm, P), Y2(Dstar,b)];
i=i+1;
end;
else
L=P*(1-eta)/2;
U=P/2;
Dstar=(L+U)/2;
i=1;
while(abs(Y1(Dstar, delta, S, Hm, P)-Y2(Dstar,b))>e)
if Y1(Dstar, delta, S, Hm, P)>Y2(Dstar,b)
L=Dstar;
else
U=Dstar;
end;
Dstar=(L+U)/2;
115
result(i,:)=[L, U, Dstar, Y1(Dstar, delta, S, Hm, P), Y2(Dstar,b)];
i=i+1;
end;
end;
%% n and q* %%
n=sqrt(S*(Hr+Hm*(2*Dstar/P-1))/(O+F)/(Hm*(1-Dstar/P)));
qstar=sqrt(2*Dstar*(O+F)/(Hr+Hm*(2*Dstar/P-1)));
prstar=(a-Dstar)/b;
A=floor(n);
paim1=Dstar*(pw-C)-S*Dstar/(A*qstar)
-Hm*(Dstar*qstar/P +(P-Dstar)*qstar*A/P/2-qstar/2);
pair1=Dstar*(prstar-pw-v)-(O+F)*Dstar/qstar-Hr*qstar/2;
pais1=paim1+pair1;
B=A+1;
paim2=Dstar*(pw-C)-S*Dstar/(B*qstar)
-Hm*(Dstar*qstar/P +(P-Dstar)*qstar*B/P/2-qstar/2);
pair2=Dstar*(prstar-pw-v)-(O+F)*Dstar/qstar-Hr*qstar/2;
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pais2=paim2+pair2;
if pais1>pais2
pais=pais1;
paim=paim1;
pair=pair1;
nstar=A;
else
pais=pais2;
paim=paim2;
pair=pair2;
nstar=B;
end;
function y1=Y1(D, delta, S, Hm, P)
y1=delta-sqrt(S*Hm)*(1-2*D/P)/sqrt(2*D*(1-D/P));
function [y2]=Y2(D,b)
y2=2*D/b;
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A2.2 Code for SMMR Algorithm (section 4.2.2)
%% Parameters %%
C=10;
S=800;
Hm=10;
R=2;
O=[50 45];
F=[100 95];
v=[1 0.9];
Hr=[11 10.5];
alpha=[0.6 0.4];
P=20000;
a=20000;
b=800;
e=0.05;
pw=15;
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var Dstar;
var prstar;
var Tstar;
var nstar1;
var nstar2;
var pair1;
var pair2;
var paim;
var pais;
var L;
var U;
var n;
result=zeros(100,5);
temp=0;
%% delta and eta %%
for i=1:R
temp=temp+sqrt((O(i)+F(i))*alpha(i)*2*Hm);
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end
delta=a/b-C-sum(alpha*v’)-sqrt(2/P)*temp;
eta=sqrt(1-(2*b^2*S*Hm)^(1/3)/P);
%% cases %%
if delta<= P*(1-eta^3)/b
disp(’Not profitable’);
elseif delta>=P*(1+eta^3)/b
Dstar=P;
elseif delta==P/b
Dstar=P/2;
elseif delta>P/b
L=P/2;
U=P*(1+eta)/2;
Dstar=(L+U)/2;
i=1;
while(abs(Y1(Dstar, delta, S, Hm, P)-Y2(Dstar,b))>e)
if Y1(Dstar, delta, S, Hm, P)>Y2(Dstar,b)
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L=Dstar;
else U=Dstar;
end;
Dstar=(L+U)/2;
result(i,:)=[L, U, Dstar, Y1(Dstar, delta, S, Hm, P), Y2(Dstar,b)];
i=i+1;
end;
else L=P*(1-eta)/2;
U=P/2;
Dstar=(L+U)/2;
i=1;
while(abs(Y1(Dstar, delta, S, Hm, P)-Y2(Dstar,b))>e)
if Y1(Dstar, delta, S, Hm, P)>Y2(Dstar,b)
L=Dstar;
else U=Dstar;
end;
Dstar=(L+U)/2;
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result(i,:)=[L, U, Dstar, Y1(Dstar, delta, S, Hm, P), Y2(Dstar,b)];
i=i+1;
end;
end;
%% n and q* %%
prstar=(a-Dstar)/b;
Tstar=sqrt(2*S*P/(Hm*Dstar*(P-Dstar)));
n=[0 0];
qstar=[0 0];
A=[0 0];
B=[0 0];
temp1=0;
for i=1:R
temp1=temp1+(O(i)+F(i))*alpha(i)*(Hr(i)-Hm)/(2*sqrt(Hr(i)+Hm));
end
for i=1:R
n(i)=Tstar*sqrt(Dstar*alpha(i)*(Hm*Dstar/P+0.5*(Hr(i)-Hm))/(O(i)+F(i)));
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A(i)=floor(n(i));
B(i)=A(i)+1;
end;
maxpais=0;
pais=[0 0 0 0];
pais(1)=Dstar*(prstar-C-sum(alpha*v’)) -(S+A(1)*(O(1)+F(1))
+A(2)*(O(2)+F(2)))/Tstar -Hm*(Dstar^2/P*Tstar*(alpha(1)/A(1)
+alpha(2)/A(2)) +Dstar*Tstar*(P-Dstar)/(2*P))
-(Hr(1)-Hm)*alpha(1)*Tstar*Dstar/2/A(1)
-(Hr(2)-Hm)*alpha(2)*Tstar*Dstar/2/A(2);
pais(2)=Dstar*(prstar-C-sum(alpha*v’)) -(S+B(1)*(O(1)+F(1))
+A(2)*(O(2)+F(2)))/Tstar -Hm*(Dstar^2/P*Tstar*(alpha(1)/B(1)
+alpha(2)/A(2)) +Dstar*Tstar*(P-Dstar)/(2*P))
-(Hr(1)-Hm)*alpha(1)*Tstar*Dstar/2/B(1)
-(Hr(2)-Hm)*alpha(2)*Tstar*Dstar/2/A(2);
pais(3)=Dstar*(prstar-C-sum(alpha*v’)) -(S+A(1)*(O(1)+F(1))
+B(2)*(O(2)+F(2)))/Tstar -Hm*(Dstar^2/P*Tstar*(alpha(1)/A(1)
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+alpha(2)/B(2)) +Dstar*Tstar*(P-Dstar)/(2*P))
-(Hr(1)-Hm)*alpha(1)*Tstar*Dstar/2/A(1)
-(Hr(2)-Hm)*alpha(2)*Tstar*Dstar/2/B(2);
pais(4)=Dstar*(prstar-C-sum(alpha*v’)) -(S+B(1)*(O(1)+F(1))
+B(2)*(O(2)+F(2)))/Tstar -Hm*(Dstar^2/P*Tstar*(alpha(1)/B(1)
+alpha(2)/B(2)) +Dstar*Tstar*(P-Dstar)/(2*P))
-(Hr(1)-Hm)*alpha(1)*Tstar*Dstar/2/B(1)
-(Hr(2)-Hm)*alpha(2)*Tstar*Dstar/2/B(2);
maxpais=max(pais);
A2.3 Code for Stochastic Model Algorithm (section 5.2.1)
%%Parameters%%
C=10;
S=800;
O=50;
F=100;
v=1;
124
Hm=10;
Hr=11;
P=20000;
a=20000;
b=600;
Bm=5;
Br=4;
T1=0;
LL=0;
rhom=1;
rhor=1;
rhom1=1.1;
rhor1=1.1;
e=0.01;
i=0;
rhomm=zeros(1,100);
rhorr=zeros(1,100);
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lll=zeros(1,100);
while((abs(rhom1-rhom)>e) || (abs(rhor1-rhor)>e))
i=i+1;
rhom=rhom1;
rhor=rhor1;
LL=6.25*(1.2-rhom)^2+5*(1.2-rhor)^2;
C=10+LL;
[nstar1,qstar1,prstar1,Dstar1]=smsr(C,S,O,F,v,Hm,Hr,P,a,b)
T1=nstar1*qstar1/Dstar1;
rhom1=0.8+(1-Hm*T1/Bm)*0.4;
rhor1=0.8+(1-Hr*T1/Br/nstar1)*0.4;
rhomm(1,i)=rhom1;
rhorr(1,i)=rhor1;
lll(1,i)=LL;
end
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Appendix 3: Mathematics of Proofs for SMSR
A3.1 Proof of Propositions 3-1, 3-2, and 3-3.
Equation (3-14) can be rewritten as
pics = (a− b · pr) [pr − C − V ]−
√
2(a− b · pr) · S ·Hm
(
1− a− b · pr
P
)
−
√
2(a− b · pr) · (O + F ) ·
[
Hr +Hm
(
2
(
a− b · pr
P
)
− 1
)]
= D
[
a−D
b
− C − V
]
−
√
2D · S ·Hm
(
1− D
P
)
−
√
2D · (O + F ) ·
[
Hr +Hm
(
2
(
D
P
)
− 1
)]
.
For notational simplicity, we denote Hr/Hm − 1 as α. It is reasonable to assume that
Hr is close to Hm, i.e., α is a small number. Thus, we assume that α2 is negligible.
Then the last term of the objective function becomes
√
2D · (O + F ) ·
[
Hr +Hm
(
2
(
D
P
)
− 1
)]
=
√
2D · (O + F ) ·Hm ·
[
α + 2
(
D
P
)]
=
√
2 · (O + F ) ·Hm
P
· [αPD + 2D2]
= 2
√
(O + F ) ·Hm
P
·
[
D +
αP
4
]
.
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Thus, the objective function could be rewritten as
pics = D
[
a−D
b
− C − V
]
−
√
2D · S ·Hm
(
1− D
P
)
−
√
2D · (O + F ) ·
[
Hr +Hm
(
2
(
D
P
)
− 1
)]
= D
[
a−D
b
− C − V
]
−
√
2D · S ·Hm
(
1− D
P
)
− 2
√
(O + F ) ·Hm
P
·
[
D +
αP
4
]
= −D
2
b
+D
[
a
b
− C − V − 2
√
(O + F ) ·Hm
P
]
−
√
2D · S ·Hm
(
1− D
P
)
−
√
(O + F ) ·Hm
P
· αP
2
.
It follows from above that
∂pics
∂D
= −2D
b
+
[
a
b
− C − V − 2
√
(O + F ) ·Hm
P
]
−
√
S ·Hm
P
·
[
P − 2D√
2D (P −D)
]
∂2pics
∂D2
= −2
b
+
√
S ·Hm[
2D
(
1− D
P
)]3 .
Again, for notational simplicity, we denote
δ =
a
b
− C − V − 2
√
(O + F ) ·Hm
P
Y1 (D) = δ −
√
S ·Hm
P
·
[
P − 2D√
2D (P −D)
]
Y2 (D) =
2D
b
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Then the first order optimility condition can be rewritten as
Y1 (D) = Y2 (D) .
Note that
∂Y1
∂D
=
√
S ·Hm[
2D
(
1− D
P
)]3 > 0
and that
∂2Y1
∂D2
= 3
√
S ·Hm[
2D
(
1− D
P
)]5 [2DP − 1
]
Thus,

∂2Y1
∂D2
> 0 if D > P
2
∂2Y1
∂D2
= 0 if D = P
2
∂2Y1
∂D2
< 0 if D < P
2
.
Therefore, Y1 is increasing and is concave in (0, P/2] and convex in [P/2, P ). More-
over, when D → 0, Y1 → −∞; when D → P , Y1 → +∞. We show Y1 on the
following graph:
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Note that Y2 is a straight line with slope of 2/b. And the points satisfying the first
order conditions are the intersection points of Y1 and Y2. The figure below shows the
possible cases for Y1 and Y2.
Cases 1 and 6: Y1 and Y2 have only one intersection point. In these cases, however,
the intersection point is a local minimum. Before the intersection, Y2 > Y1, hence,
130
∂pics
∂D
= Y1 − Y2 < 0, so pics is decreasing; while after it, Y2 < Y1, so pics is increasing after
the intersection point. Thus, there is no inner local maximum point in these two cases.
Cases 2 and 5: Y1 and Y2 have two intersection points. Following the same lines of
reasoning as above, in Case 5, the first intersection point is an inflexion point and the
second intersection point is a local minimum; whereas in Case 2, the first intersection
point is local minimum and the second is an inflexion point. Thus, there is no inner
maximum solution in these two cases.
Cases 3 and 4: Y1 and Y2 have three intersection points. In both cases, the first and
third intersection points are local minima; while the second intersection point is a local
maximum.
To determine the optimality conditions for these different cases, we examine the
conditions for inflexion points in Case 2 and Case 5 to happen respectively. In these
two cases, Y1 = Y2 and ∂Y1∂D =
∂Y2
∂D
. That is,
δ −
√
S ·Hm
P
·
[
P − 2D√
2D (P −D)
]
=
2D
b
(7.1)√
S ·Hm[
2D
(
1− D
P
)]3 = 2b (7.2)
Denote the intersection point as Dˆ. Then, following (A.2), we have
Dˆ =
P + P
√
1− 2
P
(
b2·S·Hm
4
)1/3
2
(case 2)
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or
Dˆ =
P − P
√
1− 2
P
(
b2·S·Hm
4
)1/3
2
(case 5)
Denote
√
1− 2
P
(
b2·S·Hm
4
)1/3
by η. Following (A.1), we have
δ +
(
2S ·Hm
b
) 1
3
η =
P
b
(1 + η) (case 2)
δ −
(
2S ·Hm
b
) 1
3
η =
P
b
(1− η) (case 5)
(1) If δ− (2S·Hm
b
) 1
3 η ≤ P
b
(1− η) (cases 5 & 6), that is, δ ≤ P
b
(1− η3), then there
is no inner maximum solutions; thus, if there is any maximization solutions, these solu-
tions should either have D = 0 or D = P . Moreover, under this condition, the system
profit at D = P is not greater than 0. That is, it is impossible for the manufacturer and
the retailer to gain any profits by running the business. Proposition 3-1 is proved.
(2) If δ +
(
2S·Hm
b
) 1
3 η ≥ P
b
(1 + η)(cases 1 & 2), that is, δ ≥ P
b
(1 + η3), then there
is no inner maximum solutions; thus, we check the boundary solutions. We find that,
under this condition, there is a positive system profit when D = P . Thus, the optimal
market demand is D → P , i.e. pr → a−Pb . Proposition 3-2 is proved.
(3) If δ+
(
2S·Hm
b
) 1
3 η < P
b
(1 + η) and δ ≥ P
b
(case 3), that is, P
b
≤ δ < P
b
(1 + η3),
there is a local maximum solution P
2
≤ D < P
2
(1 + η). Moreover, ∂
2pics
∂D2
= ∂Y1
∂D
− ∂Y2
∂D
<
0. Thus, pics is strictly concave in
[
P
2
, P
2
(1 + η)
)
. If δ − (2S·Hm
b
) 1
3 η > P
b
(1− η) and
δ ≤ P
b
(case 4), that is, P
b
(1− η3) < δ ≤ P
b
, then there a local maximum solution
P
2
(1− η) < D ≤ P
2
. Moreover, ∂
2pics
∂D2
= ∂Y1
∂D
− ∂Y2
∂D
> 0, thus, pics is strictly convex in
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(
P
2
(1− η) , P
2
]
.Incorporating that pr = a−Db , proposition 3-3 is proved.
A3.2 For Decentralized Supply Chain
In a decentralized supply chain, for a given wholesale price, the optimization problem
of the retailer is written as
Max
pr
pidr (pr) = (a− b · pr) · (pr − pw − V )−
√
2Hr · (O + F ) · (a− b · pr)
s.t. pr >
a− P
b
pr <
a
b
.
With D = a− b · pr, we can rewrite above problem as
Max
D
pidr (D) = D ·
(
a−D
b
− pw − V
)
−
√
2Hr · (O + F ) ·D
s.t. D > 0
D < P.
Thus,
∂pidr
∂D
=
a
b
− pw − v − 2D
b
−
√
(O + F ) ·Hr
2D
.
Let ψ1 = ab − pw − v− 2Db and ψ2 =
√
(O+F )·Hr
2D
, which are illustrated in the following
figure:
133
As indicated by the above figure, for the first order condition to have a local maximum
solution, ψ1 (D1) must be greater than ψ (D1)(D1 is the demand where and have the
same slope). Such that ψ1 and ψ2 have two intersection points. In this case, the larger
intersection point, D2, is a local maximum solution. Note that, for D1, we have
∂ψ1
∂D1
= ∂ψ2
∂D1
. Thus, D1 =
[
b2·(O+F )·Hr
32
]1/3
. Therefore, we state the following
proposition:
Proposition A2-1. If pw ≥ ab − v − 3
[
b2·(O+F )·Hr
32
]1/3
, then optimal demand level
D¯ = 0, i.e. it is not profitable for the retailer to run the business.
If ψ1 (D1) ≤ ψ2 (D1), i.e. pw ≥ ab − v − 3
[
b2·(O+F )·Hr
32
]1/3
, then ψ1 and ψ2 do
not intersect. In this case, ψ2 is always not less than ψ1. Thus, the second term in
the objective function is increasing more quickly than the first term, which means the
objective function is always decreasing. Therefore, in this case, it is not profitable for
the retailer to run the business.
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If it is profitable to run the business, then, as discussed above, D2 is a local max-
imum. If D2 ≤ P , it satisfies the boundary constraint of D. Otherwise, if D2 > P ,
then the local maximum solution D˜ = P . Note that, D2 > P is equivalent to ψ1 (P ) >
ψ2 (P ), i.e., pw < ab − v − 2Pb −
√
(O+F )·Hr
2P
. Therefore, we have the following propo-
sition.
Proposition A2-2. If pw < ab−v−3
[
b2·(O+F )·Hr
32
]1/3
, then local maximum solution
of demand level D˜ = P . Moreover, the global maximum solution of demand level is
D¯ = P if pir (P ) > 0. Otherwise, D¯ = 0.
Propositions A2-1 and A2-2 enable us to quickly solve the maximization problem
if the wholesale price satisfies either one of the conditions in these two propositions.
When the wholesale price satisfies neither of them, it is easy to search the local max-
imum solution of demand level D˜ = D2 using a binary search method. After that,
the global maximum solution of demand level is D¯ = D˜ if pir
(
D˜
)
> 0. Otherwise,
D¯ = 0.
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Appendix 4: Mathematics of Proofs for SMMR
The objective function of the SMMR maximization problem is
pis = (a− b · pr)
[
pr − C −
R∑
i=1
(Viαi)
]
− 2
√
Hm · (a− b · pr) · (P − a+ b · pr) · S
2P
− 2
R∑
i=1
√[
Hm · (a− b · pr)
P
+
Hr,i −Hm
2
]
· (a− b · pr) · αi · (Oi + Fi).
This objective function can be rewritten as
pis = D
[
a−D
b
− C −
R∑
i=1
(Viαi)
]
− 2
√
Hm ·D · (P −D) · S
2P
− 2
R∑
i=1
√[
Hm · D
P
+
Hr,i −Hm
2
]
·Di · (Oi + Fi).
For notational simplicity, we denote Hr,i/Hm − 1 as βi. It is reasonable to assume
thatHr,i is close toHm, i.e., βi is a small number. Thus, we assume that β2i is negligible.
Then the last term of the objective function becomes
√
2Di · (Oi + Fi) ·
[
Hr,i +Hm
(
2
(
D
P
)
− 1
)]
=
√
2Di · (Oi + Fi) ·Hm ·
[
βi + 2
(
D
P
)]
=
√
2 · αi(Oi + Fi) ·Hm
P
· [PβiD + 2D2]
= 2
√
αi(Oi + Fi) ·Hm
P
·
[
D +
βiP
4
]
.
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Thus, the objective function is rewritten as
pis = D
[
a−D
b
− C −
R∑
i=1
(Viαi)
]
− 2
√
Hm ·D · (P −D) · S
2P
−2
R∑
i=1
{√
αi(Oi + Fi) ·Hm
P
·
[
D +
βiP
4
]}
= −D
2
b
+D
[
a
b
− C −
R∑
i=1
(Viαi)− 2
R∑
i=1
√
αi(Oi + Fi) ·Hm
P
]
−
√
2D · S ·Hm
(
1− D
P
)
−
R∑
i=1
[√
αi(Oi + Fi) ·Hm
P
· βi · P
2
]
.
Based on the above equation, we have
∂pis
∂D
= −2D
b
+
[
a
b
− C −
R∑
i=1
(Viαi)− 2
R∑
i=1
√
αi(Oi + Fi) ·Hm
P
]
−
√
S ·Hm
P
·
[
P − 2D√
2D (P −D)
]
,
∂2pis
∂D2
= −2
b
+
√
S ·Hm[
2D
(
1− D
P
)]3 .
For notation simplicity, we denote
δ¯ =
a
b
− C −
R∑
i=1
(Viαi)− 2
R∑
i=1
√
αi(Oi + Fi) ·Hm
P
.
Note that the above maximization problem, including the objective function, the
first order derivative and the second order derivative, is essentially the same as the
maximization problem for the single-manufacturer single-retailer case in Appendix 3
137
of this thesis, except that the term δ in Appendix 3 is replaced by δ¯. Therefore, all
corresponding analyzes in Appendix 3 can be applied to this maximization problem
by replacing δ as δ¯. Propositions 5, 6, and 7 can be proved in the same manner as
propositions 1, 2 and 3.
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Appendix 5: Mathematics of Proofs for Stochastic Model
A5.1 Proof of Proposition 8
For any given D¯, T and n, the first order conditions for Sr and Sm are
∂pis
∂Sm
= − ∂
∂Sm
{
Bm · 1
T
ˆ ∞
Sm
D¯·T
(
D¯ · T · x− Sm
) · g (x) dx+Hm · Sm}
=
Bm
T
·
[
− Sm
D¯ · T · g
(
Sm
D¯ · T
)
+
[
1−G
(
Sm
D¯ · T
)]
+
Sm
D¯ · T · g
(
Sm
D¯ · T
)]
−Hm
=
Bm
T
·
[
1−G
(
Sm
D¯ · T
)]
−Hm = 0,
and
∂pis
∂Sr
= − ∂
∂Sr
{
Br · n
T
ˆ ∞
Sr
D¯T/n
(
D¯ · T
n
· x− Sr
)
g (x) dx+Hr · Sr
}
=
nBr
T
·
[
− nSr
D¯ · T · g
(
nSr
D¯ · T
)
+
[
1−G
(
nSr
D¯ · T
)]
+
nSr
D¯ · T · g
(
nSr
D¯ · T
)]
−Hr
=
nBr
T
·
[
1−G
(
nSr
D¯ · T
)]
−Hr = 0.
Thus,

Bm
T
· [1−G ( Sm
D¯·T
)]−Hm = 0
nBr
T
·
[
1−G
(
Sr
D¯·T/n
)]
−Hr = 0
.
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Therefore,
Sm = D¯ · T ·G−1
(
1− Hm · T
Bm
)
Sr =
D¯ · T
n
·G−1
(
1− Hr · T
Br · n
)
.
The second order conditions are
∂2pis
∂ (Sm)
2 =
∂
∂Sm
{
Bm
T
·
[
1−G
(
Sm
D¯ · T
)]}
= −Bm
T
· 1
D¯ · T · g
(
Sm
D¯ · T
)
< 0,
∂2pis
∂ (Sr)
2 =
∂
∂Sr
{
nBr
T
·
[
1−G
(
nSr
D¯ · T
)]}
= −nBr
T
· n
D¯ · T · g
(
nSr
D¯ · T
)
< 0,
∂2pis
∂Sr∂Sm
= 0.
Thus, pis is jointly concave in Sr and Sm.
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A5.2 Derivation for some specific distributions
Normal Distribution
When  is normally distributed, then
ˆ ∞
ρm
(x− ρm) · g (x) dx =
ˆ ∞
ρm
(x− 1) · g (x) dx−
ˆ ∞
ρm
(ρm − 1) · g (x) dx
=
ˆ ∞
ρm
(x− 1) · 1√
2piσ2
e−
(x−1)2
2σ2 dx− (ρm − 1) ·
ˆ ∞
ρm
g (x) dx
=
1√
2piσ2
ˆ ∞
ρm−1
y · e− y
2
2σ2 dy − (ρm − 1) · [1−G (ρm)]
=
−2σ2
2
√
2piσ2
e−
y2
2σ2 |∞ρm−1 − (ρm − 1) · [1−G (ρm)]
=
σ2√
2piσ2
e−
(ρm−1)2
2σ2 − (ρm − 1) · [1−G (ρm)]
= σ2 · g (ρm)− (ρm − 1) [1−G (ρm)] .
ˆ ∞
ρr
(x− ρr) · g (x) dx =
ˆ ∞
ρr
(x− 1) · g (x) dx−
ˆ ∞
ρr
(ρr − 1) · g (x) dx
=
ˆ ∞
ρr
(x− 1) · 1√
2piσ2
e−
(x−1)2
2σ2 dx− (ρr − 1) ·
ˆ ∞
ρr
g (x) dx
=
1√
2piσ2
ˆ ∞
ρr−1
y · e− y
2
2σ2 dy − (ρr − 1) · [1−G (ρr)]
=
−2σ2
2
√
2piσ2
e−
y2
2σ2 |∞ρr−1 − (ρr − 1) · [1−G (ρr)]
=
σ2√
2piσ2
e−
(ρr−1)2
2σ2 − (ρr − 1) · [1−G (ρr)]
= σ2 · g (ρr)− (ρr − 1) [1−G (ρr)] .
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Uniform Distribution
When  is uniformly distributed between 1−ψ and 1 +ψ where ψ ∈ (0, 1), then the
standard deviation is σ = ψ√
3
.
ˆ 1+ψ
ρm
(x− ρm) · g (x) dx = 1
2ψ
ˆ 1+ψ
ρm
(x− ρm) dx
=
1
2ψ
ˆ 1+ψ−ρm
0
ydy
=
1
4ψ
{
[1 + ψ − ρm]2 − 0
}
=
1
4ψ
[1 + ψ − ρm]2 .
ˆ 1+ψ
ρr
(x− ρr) · g (x) dx = 1
2ψ
ˆ 1+ψ
ρr
(x− ρr) dx
=
1
2ψ
ˆ 1+ψ−ρr
0
ydy
=
1
4ψ
{
[1 + ψ − ρr]2 − 0
}
=
1
4ψ
[1 + ψ − ρr]2 .
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Gamma Distribution
When  is gamma-distributed with a scale parameter θ and a shape parameter ξ. Since
the expected value is 1, θ · ξ = 1. The standard deviation is σ = θ · √ξ. Then
ˆ ∞
ρm
(x− ρm) · g (x) dx =
ˆ ∞
ρm
x · g (x) dx−
ˆ ∞
ρm
ρm · g (x) dx
=
ˆ ∞
ρm
x · x
ξ−1
θξΓ (ξ)
e−
x
θ dx− ρm ·
ˆ ∞
ρm
g (x) dx
=
1
θξΓ (ξ)
ˆ ∞
ρm
xξ · e−xθ dx− ρm · [1−G (ρm)]
=
θ
Γ (ξ)
ˆ ∞
ρm
(x
θ
)ξ
· e−xθ d
(x
θ
)
− ρm · [1−G (ρm)]
=
θ
Γ (ξ)
(ρm
θ
)ξ
e−
ρm
θ − (ρm − 1) · [1−G (ρm)]
= ρm · θ · g (ρm)− (ρm − 1) [1−G (ρm)] .
ˆ ∞
ρr
(x− ρr) · g (x) dx =
ˆ ∞
ρr
x · g (x) dx−
ˆ ∞
ρr
ρr · g (x) dx
=
ˆ ∞
ρr
x · x
ξ−1
θξΓ (ξ)
e−
x
θ dx− ρr ·
ˆ ∞
ρr
g (x) dx
=
1
θξΓ (ξ)
ˆ ∞
ρr
xξ · e−xθ dx− ρr · [1−G (ρr)]
=
θ
Γ (ξ)
ˆ ∞
ρr
(x
θ
)ξ
· e−xθ d
(x
θ
)
− ρr · [1−G (ρr)]
=
θ
Γ (ξ)
(ρr
θ
)ξ
e−
ρr
θ − (ρr − 1) · [1−G (ρr)]
= ρr · θ · g (ρr)− (ρr − 1) [1−G (ρr)] .
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Chi-square Distribution
When  is a chi-square distribution with expected value of 1, then
ˆ ∞
ρm
(x− ρm) · g (x) dx =
ˆ ∞
ρm
x · g (x) dx−
ˆ ∞
ρm
ρm · g (x) dx
=
ˆ ∞
ρm
x · x
−1/2
√
2Γ (0.5)
e−
x
2 dx− ρm ·
ˆ ∞
ρm
g (x) dx
=
1√
2Γ (0.5)
ˆ ∞
ρm
√
x · e−x2 dx− ρm · [1−G (ρm)]
=
−2√
2Γ (0.5)
√
ρme
− ρm
2 − (ρm − 1) · [1−G (ρm)]
= ρm · g (ρm)− (ρm − 1) [1−G (ρm)] .
ˆ ∞
ρr
(x− ρr) · g (x) dx =
ˆ ∞
ρr
x · g (x) dx−
ˆ ∞
ρr
ρr · g (x) dx
=
ˆ ∞
ρr
x · x
−1/2
√
2Γ (0.5)
e−
x
2 dx− ρr ·
ˆ ∞
ρr
g (x) dx
=
1√
2Γ (0.5)
ˆ ∞
ρr
√
x · e−x2 dx− ρr · [1−G (ρr)]
=
−2√
2Γ (0.5)
√
ρre
− ρr
2 − (ρr − 1) · [1−G (ρr)]
= ρr · g (ρr)− (ρr − 1) [1−G (ρr)] .
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